Motives for the Ethiopian Military Intervention in Somalia Post 2006 to Yet While Enhancing Fraternal Relationships of Both States

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Abstract

This Article aimed at analyzing the role of Ethiopia in conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa, particulrly in Somalia with the specific objectives of explaining the political condition of Somalia by explaining Motives for the Ethiopian Military Intervention in Somalia post 2006 and analyzing the effectiveness of Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia conflict. The study adopted qualitative reasearch Metdology approach to explain Motives for the Ethiopian Military Intervention in Somalia in which the data were collected from Somalia Embassy in Ethiopia and Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through organized and well-prepared interview guidelines. The study result showed that Motives for the Ethiopian Military Intervention in Somalia. Currnetly political condition of Somalia is not capable to build organized governement; the Transitional government needs support of other countries like Ethiopia. The involvement of Ethiopia also have value in the way that struggling AlShabaab, Islamic Court Union and other terrorist groups. From the result of this study the researcher recommended that peace is not only a need for individual but rather it is worldwide and not only Ethiopia but also all nations should give a due consideration for the establishment of stability in all countries.
Keywords: Al-shabaab; Conflict; Ethiopia; Horn of Africa; Governance; International relation; Intervention; Terrorism.

1. Introduction

Somalia's protracted crisis of civil war and state collapse is now approaching over two decades of duration, and constitutes the longest-running instance of complete state collapse in the post- colonial era. The difficulties in achieving peace have highlighted the powerlessness of the international community. The roots of the Somali conflict are deep and obscure, to the point that the prospects for a solution appear to be moving further away rather than closer. Several attempts have been made by regional and international actors to build peace. Evidence suggests that the methods used to reconcile the actors involved in the struggle have been ineffective. Major aspects of the crisis have been neglected, namely the anthropological and communitarian dimensions of Somali society (Loubser, 2012). Somalia's mono ethnic could not protect from the instability such as civil war, tribe war or clannism and territorial or boundary disputes. The conflict in Somalia engender human crisis in the country as it is likely to see the cases of all the Horn of Africa countries (Fanuel, 2012).

Ethiopia has a long history in playing a great role in conflict resolution and peacekeeping in the region, in Africa and out of the continent; for instance its role in Korea .The Ethiopian army fought in a number of engagements as member of UN including the battle of Pork Chop Hill during the Korean war in 1951 (http://www.ethiopiamilitary.com ,2012:1-2).

Ethiopian foreign and national security policy and strategy drafted to protect its national interests and to ensure Ethiopia's survival as a country, and its basic thrust is designed to bring about a fundamental change of attitude regarding the essence of foreign relations and national security. In order to bring this, the policy and strategy bases it on the internal challenges and vulnerability to threats that have an influence on its survival, and its focus is on tasks that should be carried out within the country. The direction is to move from the internal to what is external, addressing internal problems first, thereby enabling its shortcomings. Our foreign relations and national security policy and strategy are designed to address the gaps that need to be filled. The external environment is viewed from the prism of our national situation and this ensures that the policy and strategy have relevance to our national security and survival (Ethiopian Ministry of Ethiopian Foreign Affairs, 2015).

In a fundamental sense, security policy is a matter of ensuring national survival. In order to formulate a foreign affairs and security policy that addresses these issues, it is important to identify and examine the sources and basis from which the policy springs (ibid: 9). The overall volatility of the Horn in terms of political stability, poverty, political and economic marginalization, largely unsecured territories, and states' internal conflicts and weaknesses provide a platform and create potential breeding grounds for current and future terrorism in the region (West, 2005). Ethiopia, along with the USA, therefore, decided to engage in the Horn of Africa militarily by establishing the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002 in order to confront states control their ungoverned spaces, especially borders and coastlines. CJTF-HOA was initially established with roughly 1400 military personnel who oversee a region that encompasses Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen, and Ethiopia (Ibid). CJTF-HOA is based in strategically important Djibouti. The United States also designed other counter terrorism measures and projects like East African Counter Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) and then East African Regional Security Initiative (EARSI) where the latter replaced the former. The US was also involved in

other less visible and less popular counter terrorism measures especially in Somalia that affected the whole Horn of Africa as it is a 'region of security complex' (Gedion, 2011).

This shows that Somalia has a long history in war with neighboring countries and internal civil war. Currently, due to globalization the international community tries to solve conflicts and disagreements together. Ethiopia is one of the countries that tirelessly participates in conflict resolution in the region so as to ensure peace and stability in Somalia. This study, thus focuses on explaining and investigating the role of Ethiopia in conflict resolution in the horn of Africa, especially in the post 1991 Somalia. This difficulty was evidenced by the war between the union of Islamic courts (UIC) supported by international terrorism and the Transitional federal Government (TFG) of Somalia supported by Ethiopia, which had militarily intervened in Somalia from 2006-2009 (Tafese, 2009).

2. Research Questions

This study attempts to answer the following research question.
What are the motives behind for Ethiopian Military intervention in Somalia?

3. Objectives of the Study

To find out the reason behind for Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia.

Research Methods and Methodologies

The study adopted qualitative reasearch Method approach to explain the Motives of   Ethiopia in Ethiopian Military intervention in Somalia to describes social phenomenon by using words.

4. Motives for the Ethiopian Military Intervention in Somalia
4.1. Terrorism

Somalia is a threat to international peace and security because of its potential as a terrorist breeding ground and safe haven. However, it is the instability resulting from the failure of the Somali state itself that poses the greatest danger both to the outside world and to Somalis themselves. The current Somali "government" with the widest international recognition controls little more than half of the capital, Mogadishu, and is simply unable to combat terrorism in a meaningful way. It cannot police its borders, provide viable political or economic alternatives to radical groups, or even gather meaningful intelligence. If left in such a dismal condition, Somalia will incubate or at least offer shelter to extremist elements that can operate unchallenged and undetected. Action to reconstruct the state is needed now, or Somalia will remain a danger for many years to come (ICG, 2002).

Al-Itihaad has an overt political agenda and, like many political actors in the country, a demonstrated penchant for violence. Although its leadership is known to include prominent commercial and political figures throughout Somalia, the membership tends to be discreet, even clandestine, making it difficult to assess the organization's size and composition. The core membership probably numbers in the hundreds rather than the thousands but many more Somalis have a loose association with it or are generally sympathetic. The concept of "affiliation" is fluid in Somalia, however, frequently utterly pragmatic and thus reversible. Nevertheless, given its high level of organization, countrywide membership and financial resources, al-Itihaad enjoys obvious advantages over many other political organizations in the country. It is not possible to put a firm date on al-Itihaad's inception or give its leader a name or face. Its roots date from the mid-1970s when the strongman of that time, Siyaad Barre, introduced new "Family Laws" that provoked an outcry from conservative Muslims. Barre cracked down on outspoken clerics and executed a number of them, driving supporters underground or into exile. Al-Itihaad emerged as an organized force in 1991, immediately following the collapse of the Barre regime, when it took control of the port of Bosaaso and established training camps in several parts of the country (ICG, 2002).

4.2. Rise of the Islamic Courts Union

There is controversy on the rise of Islamic courts, which are the basis of the United Islamic Courts (UIC) in Somalia. On the one hand, the emergence of the Islamic courts is related with clans. The UIC are seen as a form of local response to the existing lawlessness and that they are based on a particular clan and serve its interests. On the other hand, the establishment of the UIC is related with the business community, which needed to enhance security and improve commercial transaction (Kinfe, 2006).

The rise of the UIC is also linked to Al-Itihad. After its defeat by Ethiopian forces in 1996 and its failure to control political power in Somalia, Al-Itihad was forced to change its strategy. Medhane stated that "after the defeat of Al-Itihad shifted its modes away from direct politico-military confrontation to expanding its influence as a grass root movement for order, stability, and moral rectitude" (Medhane T., 2002). To this end, Al-Itihad adopted a long term strategy of educating the Somali society and preparing them for an Islamic government. It also established numerous Islamic schools, relief centers, financial institutions and Islamic courts. In 1998, a number of Islamic courts were established under the leadership of Sheikh Hasan Dahir Aweys, a former vice chairman and military commander of Al-Itihad and a member of Haber GidirAyr clan, a sub clan of the Hawiye. For these reasons, the UIC were considered as the creation of Al-Itihad (ICG, 2006).

All these three explanations focusing on the influence of the business community, the Hawiye clan and Al-Itihad, offer an opportunity to identify the factors that contributed for the rise of the UIC in different parts of the

southern Somalia. Some observers argue that the UIC organizing the leadership of different Islamic courts emerged in 2002, while ICG reports put the founding data to 2004. According to ICG, the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts of Somalia (SCIC) was founded in 2004 with the objective of uniting the activities of the Islamic courts, however, marks 2006 as the real unification year (ICG, 2006; Moller, 2007). In any case, it should be noted that certain elements of Al-Itihad have effectively politicized and used the Islamic courts as a vehicle to expanding their sphere of influence in most parts of southern Somalia (Kinfe, 2006; Medhane Tadesse., 2000). Generally, long-term security goals, mistrust of the TFG, and long-term geopolitical power-security motives have forced Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia.

Al-Ithaid or the Somali Islamic Union (SIU) is the foremost Somali fundamentalist movement, which has its origins in the 1950s, Arabs, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt played an important role in the establishment of the group. Most of the leaders of Al-Ithaid have taken religious education in religious institutions of Saudi Arabia, and Egypt Al-Ithaids followers ware also highly influenced by the Islamic teachers, judges and prayer leaders to Somali to train Somalis. Therefore, it was these students who studded Islamic theology abroad that laid the foundation of Islamic extremism and that of Al-Ithad in Somalia (Moller, 2007). UN like in 1960s, however Ai-Itihad was unable to function officially in the 1970s and1980s when Barre declared scientific Socialism outlawing political Islam. Barre was in favor of a revolutionary state rather than a theocratic one. So Barre banned all the political parties advocating Islamism and took serious of measures against their supporters. Therefore, Al-Ithaid was forced to operate under ground during Barres period, and it officially declared its existence in 1991 after Barre removal (Adar, 2002).

Ethiopia has vast security interests in Somalia, some of which have led it into direct confrontation with Somalia (e.g. armed conflicts in 1964, 1977 and the intervention in 2006 and 2012). Its long-standing war with Eritrea (1961-1991, 1998-2000) for many years crossed national borders and was waged directly or in proxy conflicts on Somali soil. Moreover, a loose network of various Jihadist groups, especially Al-Itihad, has on various occasions challenged Ethiopian forces using military attacks (e.g. in the period 1991–1996). As important for understanding Ethiopia's strategic interest in Somalia is the Somali inhabited region of Ogaden. This region has for a long time nurtured the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). External mediation is therefore much needed to overcome this security dilemma (Medhane Tadesse., 2000).

As illustrated earlier, Ethiopia is mistrustful of a unitary Somali state where power is concentrated in Mogadishu. Hence, the Ethiopian intervention should be seen as a wish to push the post conflict political transition in Somalia towards a federal state. The many challenges that the federal government in Mogadishu is confronted with in securing control of the entire Somali territory makes the strategic calculus easy from Ethiopia's point of view. Besides, a stronger grip on local rebel groups helps Ethiopia prevent cross border attacks. Ethiopia needs to calibrate this view with Somalia; otherwise there could be more profound tension between the two states (Kinfe, 2006).

Ethiopia's motive for engagement in Somalia is mainly one of geopolitical self-interest rather than any deep benevolence towards Somalia. As a key power player in the region, it currently finds itself with the political, military and intelligence capacity to prevent potential threats and contain regional spillover through offensive engagements in Somalia. Faced with a weak Somalia on several aspects-political, economic, and social and security Ethiopia has the means and capacity to shape the conflict dynamics in Somalia to its own advantage. Pursuing national interests itself, however, cannot be a working formula for a stable Somalia and the whole region. As the geopolitical landscape is reconfigured such unilateral action risks undermining each-others interests (Kinfe, 2006).

4.2.1. UIC's Confrontation with the TFG

As the UIC advanced to the southern and central Somalia, preparing itself to attack the regional administration of Puntland and, if possible, the Somaliland too, internationally recognized TFG was confined to Baidoa, the only town that the TFG effectively controlled (Perio, 2007; Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen, 2007). Seriously concerned with the UIC's advance, Ethiopia strengthened its military, diplomatic and financial support to the TFG. The peace talks ceased as the UIC become reluctant to any negotiation until Ethiopian forces withdrew from Somalia.

The confrontation between the Ethiopian backed TFG and the UIC escalated into crisis when the UIC militias advanced to Baidoa and controlled the town of Beled-Weyn, close to the Ethiopian border. The TFG saw the looming danger and called for international support. In response to the TFG's call, the UIC threatened to declare jihad if any international troops intervened in Somalia (Duhul, 2007). Despite the warnings, Ethiopia officially intervened in Somalia on December 20, 2006 (ICG, 2006; Roughnen, 2007).

4.3. The uprising of Al-Shabaab

The Ethiopian support to the TFG was visible in the unilateral military intervention of the 2006 (Kapalan, 2010). This military intervention did little to restore the Ethiopia's negative image in Somalia as the military offensives on suspected Al Qaeda militants commenced with innocent lives paying the price (Elliot and Holzer, 2009).This first Ethiopian involvement since the Ogaden War and subsequent withdrawal was aimed at Al Qaeda militants who were involved in the hotel embassy bombing in Dire Dawa and Harar cities in 1996. Somalia's interim President Abdullahi Yusuf backed the Ethiopian action and was quoted: 'Ethiopia has a right to bombard terrorist suspects who attacked its hotels in Dire Dawa and Harar' (BBC News, 2012). In response al-Qaeda deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri's interment message encouraged the courts to launch suicide bombings against the Ethiopian forces (Elliot and Holzer, 2009). The offensive did succeed in killing 10 al-Qaeda affiliates but not the three they specifically

aiming for, namely Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Abu Taha al-Sudan and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan. Thirty one civilians paid the price instead (Rice, 2007).

Ethiopia assisted the TFG through the detention of 'terrorist suspects'. Most of these suspects provided by the TFG government had little or no al-Qaeda ties and were fighters of the UIC, which proves that the TFG used the strategic response of anti-terror to its own internal advantage and interest (Elliot and Holzer, 2009). Ethiopia's strong anti-terror rhetoric played to its advantage in the greater RSC, and its nemesis Eritrea. As Ethiopia continued to roll in Somalia, Eritrea sensed the bias of Ethiopia's big brother i.e. the US as Eritrea was listed as a state sponsor of terror (Bah, 2009). Elliot and Holzer (2009) illustrate the regional balance of power as follows, *'When President Ahmed met with his Ethiopian counterparts for the first time in 2009, the first question raised was-'the Islamic courts had warm relationships with Asmara, not whether [the Courts] were Salafi or jihadist*.'' Clashes between the TFG and insurgency resulted in thousands of deaths and displacement of 700,000 civilians in Mogadishu during 2007 (CRD, 2009).

Close to a year after the Ethiopian invasion, the disarray in TFG and its opposition was visible with moderate opposition to the TFG from the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), which had more radical opposition, namely Al-Shabaab publicly breaking ties with its former UIC comrades. The TFG stepped down Prime Minister Ghedi and allowed Hassan Hussein Nur 'Adde' to form a new cabinet (Menkhaus, 2009). The underlying clan dynamics played a role in Yusuf's choice of this Hawiye seasoned humanitarian worker (Abdi, 2007). Yet, this step was not sufficient, since the message of the TFG's over-reliance on Ethiopian support had a negative influence on its legitimacy. Domestically, from its own citizens, although it still enjoyed recognition internationally (Elliot and Holzer, 2009).

Al-Shabaab fled to the interior of the country at the beginning of the Ethiopian occupation and started to undergo the transformation of a small militia taking commands from the UIC to an autonomous political movement with Eritrean support, keen to use Somalia as a playground for a proxy war against Ethiopia (Menkhaus, 2009). Al-Shabaab is described as having transnational ambitions with the goal of forming a fundamentalist Islamist state across the Horn region. Its origins can be traced back to Al-Itihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) headed by Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys with assistance in the form of training camps and other protection (Stevenson, 2010).

Elliot and Holzer (2009) state that the "War on Terror" jargon in the Horn presented validation for the militarization of the Horn region Stevenson (2010) analyses Ethiopian support to the TFG in ousting the UIC as having temporarily addressed the terrorism problem but re-emphasized the vote of no confidence from Somalis in their Ethiopian neighbors. The Ethiopian intervention further enflamed anti-Ethiopian sentiment among the local population in Somalia (Pham, 2009).

Al-Shabaab did not only reign in terror in southern Somalia but also in Somaliland and Puntland, who had been victims of Al Shabaab attacks during October 2008 when five coordinated explosions targeted local-government offices and Ethiopian consulate (Stevenson, 2010: 29). These attacks illustrate external actors being targeted by Al Shabaab fighters. The use of suicide attacks by Al-Shabaab started in 2006 with fluctuating cases of four in 2007, two in 2008 and five in 2009 (Ibrahim, 2010). Theses suicide attacks occurred prior to official alignment to Al-Qaeda in February 2010. The extremist nature of Al-Shabaab had an effect on the AU response to state failure and intensified the war on terror rhetoric. (CRD, 2009) states that the Ethiopian occupation supported the perception that certain external actors have a vested interest in the continuous state of war in Somalia, since a weak Somalia is incapable of pursuing its irredentist projects of the past. These vested interests are problematic for mediation processes as regional spoilers might be at play. The Ethiopian occupation instigated Al-Shabaab to use 'crusader' language towards the TFG to be wholly reliant on foreign 'infidels' (Ibrahim, 2010). The unifying effect of the occupation can be seen in various armed groups and civilians since the presence was seen as an embarrassment (Bah, 2009).

The Djibouti agreement of August 2008 and the subsequent agreement of November 2008 were the fruits of the international community's aim of achieving a centrist coalition of TFG which had six key elements: 1) an ending of hostilities, 2) a joint security force, 3) the deployment of AU peacekeeping force,4) Ethiopian force withdrawal, 5) two year extension of TFG mandate from August 2009 to August 2011, 6) an additional 275 seats in the parliament to allow opposition entry and the formation of a unity government (Menkhaus, 2009).

The additional seats in parliament had 200 given to the ARS and 75 to civil society including women, business community and Diaspora with the vision that this more inclusive parliament will vote for new leadership, which alluded to president Yusuf, feeling that the process corroded presidential control, especially with the tension existing between him and Adde. The actors participated include representatives from countries such as Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, international and regional organizations namely the AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, and the UN (Kasaija, 2010). Unfortunately, the agreement was signed by those who had little territorial control which proved problematic for implementation purposes (Kapalan, 2010).

The ASWJ emerged in 1991 with Sufi leaders opposing the limitations enforced by reformist leaders. Their Sufi nature is opposed to militant/reformist Islam, like Wahhabi (Abbink, 2006). Sufism, furthermore, focuses on peace and on delegitimizing fundamentalist movements. Therefore, it is moderate (ICG, 2005). ASWJ, being Sufi is anti Salafist and Wahhabi. Wahhabi Purism and Salafi Jihadism are linked, as Salafism evolved out of Wahhabism that was spread by Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and promoted with petro-dollars in religious schools (called 'madrasas') and other charities to enforce a 'conservative shield' for the Muslim world against communism (ICG, 2010). Other sects of Islam are seen as 'deviants' including members of the Sufi Islam who worship saints (awliyaa) due to their powers and spiritual closeness (taqqrrub) to God. The Salafist Al-Shabaab and has wreaked havoc in Sufi shrines (ICG, 2010). Al Shabaab and its extremist nature will be discussed briefly when the renewed TFG and its opposition

is analyzed in respect of the AU response, especially in the form of AMISOM forces, as well as the regional dynamics at play with Kenyan and Ethiopian involvement.

The inter-TFI disagreements escalated to such a level that they were seen as obstacles to peace in Somalia. Consequently, the IGAD Council of Ministers met in November 2008 and decided to freeze assets of these perpetrators, as well as implement travel bans which were endorsed by the AU PSC. Yet, the conflict between Prime Minister Adde and President Yusuf continued and Kenya's targeted sanctions on the Somali leaders who were considered to be barriers to the peace further endangered Yusuf to his resignation. His resignation was tendered on 29 December 2008 and he left Mogadishu for Puntland (Kasaija, 2010).

5 .First Round Ethiopian Military Intervention In Somalia (2006-2009)

This sub‑section explain the 2006 Ethiopian unilateral military intervention in Somalia through interviews and its impact and effectiveness from different literatures and data's collected from target populations. Ethiopia plays a great role in the horn of Africa in maintaining peace and stability.Ethiopian troops are strong in Africa in peacekeeping operations such as against Al-shabab, and supporting Somalia to have political, social and economical recovery.

The War in Somalia is an armed conflict involving largely Ethiopian and Somali TFG forces and Somali troops from Puntland aganist the ICU, and other affiliated militias for control of the country. There is a clear connection between the war in Somalia and the 2006 Ethiopian military intervention in the country. The war officially began shortly before July 20, 2006 when U.S. backed Ethiopian troops intervened in Somalia to help the TFG in Baidoa. The Somali TFG in invited Ethiopia to intervene, which became an "unpopular decision". Subsequently the leader of the ICU, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, declared "Somalia is in a state of war, and all Somalis should take part in this struggle against Ethiopia". On 24 December 2006 , Ethiopia stated it would actively combat the ICU. Ethiopian troops participated in two rounds of military operation and are still there. The first round is from 2006-2009 based on the request of the TFG for peacekeeping operations and including Ethiopia the number of soldiers were 50,000.

The Ethiopian government declared that it had deployed only a small contingent of military trainers in their hundreds, not a fighting force, in support of the TFG. But, the UN declared that "as many as 8000 Ethiopian troops may have been deployed in Somalia. Some even put up the estimation up to 20,000 troops" (Associated Press, 2006) On December 20, 2006, the TFG backed by Ethiopian forces launched heavy military attack on the UIC militias (Africa Research Bulletin, 2007).

The UIC tried to thwart the attack using different mechanisms. Internally, the UIC tried to recruit fighters and mobilize popular support using Ethiopia's unilateral intervention as a pretext.Several radio stations aired patriotic songs, urging Somalis to defend their country, some dating back to the 1977-1978 Ogaden war (Gentleman, 2007a). The UIC also closed schools to send more teenagers to the front against the advancing Ethiopian and TFG forces (Brown, 2007). Externally, the UIC was allegedly supported by 2,000 Eritrean soldiers, unknown number of ONLF fighters reportedly arrived in Somalia between June and December 2006 (ICG, 2007).

The UN also reported that the UIC was backed by some Afghanistan-trained international jihadists. Moreover, "a number of Muslim mercenaries from Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan, who went to turn Somalia into the third front of jihad, after Iraq and Afghanistan, fought along the side of the UIC" (Grono, 2007). The UIC also amassed weapons from Arab states such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen (Routers, 2006).

The serious battles were fought along the Baidoa-Mogadishu road between the UIC militias and the TFG forces backed by Ethiopia. The fighting continued for two weeks and by December 27, 2006, the UIC fighters were forced to retreat to positions close to Mogadishu. The UIC, however, insisted that the move was a tactical withdrawal (Africa Research Bulletin, 2007). As the war continued, the AU and the Arab League urged the conflicting parties to agree on the ceasefire and resume peace talks (Africa Research Bulletin, 2007). But the fighting continued and the TFG continued to advance and controlled Jowhar-the last major power town on the road to Mogadishu (ibid). Consequently, the TFG advanced towards Mogadishu, the UIC's strong hold, and the UIC withdrew without a fight on December 28, 2006 (Gentleman, 2007a).

A large number of fighters of the once-feared Al-Shabaab, the back bone of the military force of the UIC, simply fled to neighboring states such as Yemen, Kenya and Eritrea. The last remnants of the UIC forces were trapped in Kismayo, a port city in southern Somalia. As the TFG and Ethiopian forces took over Kismayo, some UIC forces headed south towards RasKamboni, a heavily forested area along the Somali-Kenyan border, and a place that the Islamists had used as a hide-out (Gettleman, 2007b). As the Ethiopian and TFG forces continued to hunt down the Islamists, Kenya collaborated by increasing border security to keep the Islamists from escaping (Wallisin, 2007). The Kenyan police captured the former moderate UIC chairman, Sheikh Sherif Ahmed (Wallisin, 2007). The US had supported the war by providing Ethiopia with armies, fuel and intelligence support (Serchuk, 2007). It launched at least four airstrikes on the village of RasKamboni and the port of Kismayo against the fleeing Islamists and suspected Al-Qaeda elements (Rice, 2007). The US Navy also patrolled Somalia Indian Ocean coast line in order to prevent the Islamists from escaping by sea. Despite such efforts some of the most wanted Al-Qaeda suspects were not killed or captured (Meyer and Sanders, 2007; Mohammed, 2007).

The invasion proved easier than expected probably because of "the heterogeneity of forces involved within the UIC, and the collapse of the support of its constituencies" (Marchal, 2007). Furthermore, the division within the courts after the first battle with Ethiopia, where "the clan elders, the business community and the moderates accused the hardliners of dragging the movement into a costly and dangerous war with Ethiopia" led the UIC into its final dissolution (Menkhaus, 2012). After the UIC defeat, the Ethiopian forces restored the TFG in power (Arman, 2007). Following the Ethiopian withdrawal, the transitional government expanded its parliament to include the opposition

and elected Sheikh Ahmed as its new president on January 31, 2009. Generally, the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and election of the new Islamist leadership, in early 2009 has not brought a conclusion to the conflict. The fighting has now shifted into a struggle between hard line Islamists and more moderate factions within the government, thus keeping the Somali crisis to go on for some years and generations to come.

6. Ethiopia's continued its Military Presence in Somalia (2012 to Date)

Addis Ababa July 06/2016 EBC news Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn said Ethiopia will consolidate the support for the government of Somalia so as to improve the capacity of the military of the Horn of African nation to safeguard its security and stability. This was disclosed when the Premier conferred here with his Somali counterpart Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. Hailemariam said Ethiopia will give the necessary assistance to Somali in order to build the country's military capacity so that it could ensure peace and stability by itself, according to a high level official who attended the meeting. Even though, Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia under AMISOM has brought commendable result, it is important to strengthen the capacity of the military to ensure everlasting peace in the east African region, the premier stated.

In this regard, Ethiopia will extend the assistance that will enable Somalia build strong military. On his part, Prime Minister of Somalia Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke appreciated Ethiopia's role in weakening Al-shabaab, the Al-Qeaeda affiliated terrorist group in Somalia. Ethiopia has deployed 4,900 troops to Somalia to fight Al-Shabaab under AMISOM.

The second round is from 2012 up to the present accounted 4500 troops as the contribution of AMISOM and they are still in Somalia (Interview with Somalia Embassy Immigration officer Adis Ababa,24 April,2015).Some observers fear that Ethiopia could withdraw its forces from Somalia. Given the TFG's weakness and escalating insurgent attacks, and if Ethiopia decides to redeploy if not withdraw its troops; the most likely outcome will be the end of the TFG (Menkhaus, 2007). Prolonged stay is, however, something which Ethiopia cannot afford at the moment (Serchuk, 2007). Ethiopia is trapped by the growing ONLF insurgency in the Somali region of Zone 5, its current hostilities with Eritrea, ever-increasing domestic opposition and international pressure to pull back its troops" (ibid).

Ethiopia will not withdraw in a security vacuum reflecting the stance of the Ethiopian government. Just recently, ex-foreign minister Seyoum Mesfin declared in Mogadishu that 'efforts of stabilizing Somalia was equally important as building democracy in Ethiopia", tying the fate of the regime with success in Somalia (Braden, 2009). Ethiopia will be forced, thus, to stay longer in Somalia mainly for two reasons: lack of commitment from the African states to replace its forces in Somalia and pressure from the US. With the US facit support Ethiopia decided to drive Al‐shabab out of Somalia. The relatively well-trained and well-armed Ethiopian troops smashed the weak resistance of the Islamic Courts, and installed a transitional government in Mogadishu. The transitional government is the recognised government of Somalia today, even though it do not even control entire Mogadishu (Allison, 2011).

Ethiopian military involvement in Somalia was effective and that it promotes friendship between somalis and Ethiopians. For instance Ethiopian who live in Somalia can live as other Somalians andelps this hdevelop sense of brotherhood. It is also important to fight aganist common enemies together (Interview with Somalia Embassy Immigration officer Adis Ababa,24 April,2015).

7. Conclusion

In Somalia, there is no central government for over the last twenty years that resulted in the civil war. It has profond consequences on Somalia and its neighbours like the problems of refugees, the rise of terrorist groups, the outbreak of epidemic diseases, environmental degradations and so on.

During the past two decades of Somalia's statelessness, the building block approach of federal state and unitary forms of state structures have been explored at length: Ethiopia is an advocator of the former, whereas Kenya and Djibouti support the later, since a strong Somalia would provide a counterbalance to Ethiopia's hegemonic aspirations (Stevenson, 2010).

The study examined the motives of Ethiopia in conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. Since the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991 and the coming power of the EPRDF government domestic and international expectations have been heightened regarding Ethiopia's role as an important member of the international community.

Currently, Ethiopia has committed itself to contribute troops to AMISOM, AU, and UN and it may be asked to respond immediately should a conflict in the sub-region or in the region arise. Therefore all efforts must be exerted to organize peacekeeping contingents and be ready for any emergency requests made by AMISOM, the AU. From the study Ethiopia plays a key role in peace building and conflict resolution process in the horn of Africa and Somalia in particular. In Somalia Ethiopia sent troops in two rounds First, from 2006-2009 by the conscience of the TFG of Somalia, and the second mission is from 2012 to these days in which more than 4500 troops with other supporting countries like Kenya and Uganda and others by AMISOM have participated (Somalia Embassy,24 April 2015. When we see the effectiveness of the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia it was effective in such a way that fighting against Alshabab and other internal and external forces quite concluded with victory. Though the military victory over the UIC and Alshabab was a sources to Ethiopia, it was not enough to bring an end to Somalia's numerous political, socio-economic and security problems. Basically, language problem and difference in religious view were the challenges of troops in communication with the Somali peoples to facilitate the mission.

In general, Ethiopia plays a great role in Africa particularly in Somalia by participating in different peace missions under the auspices UN,AU, AMISOM and other organizations. Not only participation the effectiveness also received great honor from different countries.

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