



The Journal of Social Sciences Research

ISSN: 2411-9458

Vol. 1, No. 4, pp: 41-46, 2015

URL: <http://arpgweb.com/?ic=journal&journal=7&info=aims>

Dealing with Ghana's Winner-Takes-All Politics: A Case for Proportional Representation?

Ransford Edward Van Gyampo

Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science of the University of Ghana

Abstract: This paper is the first in a series of publications aimed at provoking thought and discourse on issues relating to "Winner-Takes-All" politics in Ghana. It discusses winner-takes-all as an electoral formula and situates it within the context of winner-takes-all politics in Ghana. It highlights the dangers of Ghana's winner-takes-all politics such as the marginalization of perceived political opponents and the feeling of exclusion from the governance process by those who do not belong to the government/ruling party. The paper argues further that winner-takes-all politics undermines the quest for national development, cohesion and the drive towards democratic maturity. In proffering policy recommendation, the paper critically examines Proportional Representation as one possible mechanism for ensuring inclusive governance and dealing with some of the challenges associated with winner-takes-all politics.

Keywords: Winner-takes-all; Politics of exclusion; Opposition parties; National cohesion; Development; Elections; Proportional representation.

1. Introduction

Ghana's 1992 Constitution prescribed an arrangement for competition, which leans on Winner-Takes-All (WTA) as a *formula* for the selection of leaders. But the WTA is not merely an electoral formula for determining winners in elections. It is also a political method for facilitating the evaluative inclusion and exclusion of individuals, groups and classes of persons, i.e., a mechanism for political discrimination, recrimination and exclusion. WTA entails two distinct but interrelated elements, namely (a) "a single winner plurality voting system for majoritarian rule" and (b) "state capture" or the partisan monopolization of state resources, facilities and opportunities, as well as the exclusion of political opponents from national governance. It is in this second regard that WTA is considered most problematic as it manifests as "a zero-sum tendency in politics" characterized by marginalization and exclusion of actors in opposing groups from access to resources and other entitlements and incentives.

With a liberal, competitive democratic ethos of the Constitution, its framers might reasonably have anticipated that victorious political parties would reach out to opposition parties to promote cooperation and collaboration for the national good Abotsi (2013). However the nation's experience of constitutional democratic dispensation over the past twenty-two years amply testifies that this lofty expectation has not materialized. Instead, politicians in Ghana have interpreted Winner-Takes-All beyond the confines of elections to a more literal meaning that enables state resources to be used for political compensation to supporters, political victimization of opponents and all others who do not belong to the ruling party as well as "contemptuous disregard for the opposition"¹. In this regard, elections have become "a do-or-die affair"²; political campaigns have been decidedly intense, fierce, ruthless, unyielding and perpetual events in the four-year political cycle; and parliamentary proceedings have been fraught with frequent boycotts by the minority as a result of entrenched positions and frustrations they experience from the majority Oquaye (2014). Given the dangers of winner-takes-all, concerns have been raised by many Ghanaians about the need to tackle the central problem.

In a series of papers, we will discuss in detail, possible measures that could be implemented to curtail the negative effects of winner-takes-all politics in Ghana. In series one, this paper essentially discusses Proportional Representation as a possible solution to winner-takes-all politics. It is divided into five main sub-sections. Section one introduces the study and problem of investigation. Section two critically examines winner-takes-all as a formula for selecting leaders and highlights its distinction from winner-takes-all politics. Section three discusses the causes of

¹ The author is grateful to Professor Aaron Mike Oquaye, Political Scientist and Former Deputy Speaker of Parliament of the Republic of Ghana for this view. According to him, it would be difficult to locate who is responsible for what and who must be accountable to Ghanaians when all across the political divide are made part of the ruling government.

² See IEA Issues Paper on Winner-Takes All for Public Consultations

winner-takes-all politics as well as its practical implications and dangers. In section four, the paper undertakes a thorough review of Proportional Representation as a possible solution to winner-takes-all politics. Finally in section five, concluding remarks are made.

2. Explaining Winner-Takes-All as an Electoral Formula

Winner-Takes-All (WTA), also referred to as the Plurality Voting System or First-Past-The-Post (FPTP), is a single-winner voting system often used to elect executive officers or members of a legislative assembly which is based on single-member constituencies (Ayelazuno, 2011; O'Neill, 2006). It is the most common system, used in Canada, India, UK and US. In this voting system, the winner of an election is the person with the most votes. In other words, a simple majority of votes is what is important as there is no requirement that the winner gain an absolute majority of votes (ibid). The Majoritarian System is an additional but less common type of WTA. The slight difference between the Majoritarian System and the traditional WTA is that the winning candidate in the Majoritarian System is required to earn a majority of votes (at least fifty percent plus one) in order to be declared a winner (Nicholson, 1992).

The Majoritarian System employs one of three means for producing a winner. First, it may require a second election (run-off between the two leading parties) in the event that no candidate earns a majority of votes in the first election as the Ghanaian example in a Presidential Election shows. Alternatively, a second election may be held for all the parties that contested the first round. The winner in the run-off election would be the candidate or party that obtains a plurality of votes – that is, more votes than any other candidate. The third mechanism, the Alternative Vote (AV) is a preferential system where the voter has the chance to rank the candidates in order of preference. The voter puts a '1' by their first choice a '2' by their second choice, and so on, until they no longer wish to express any further preferences or run out of candidates. Candidates are elected outright if they gain more than half of the first preference votes. If not, the candidate who lost (the one with least first preferences) is eliminated and their votes are redistributed according to the second (or next available) preference marked on the ballot paper. This process continues until one candidate has half of the votes and is elected (Dyck, 2006). This mechanism could be described as a way of conducting a run-off election in advance. However, given its technical and complicated nature, it does not seem appealing to many countries (O'Neill, 2006). Indeed, in a UK-wide referendum in 2011 the British were asked if they wanted to replace FPTP with the AV system for electing members of parliament. The referendum produced a definitive NO vote against AV.³ Given the literacy rate and huge numbers of rejected ballots that characterizes the conduct of elections in Ghana, it may also not be suitable for Ghana. For instance in the 2008 and 2012 elections, rejected ballots constituted 2.4% and 2.23 respectively of the total votes cast.⁴ These spoilt ballots could have avoided the 2008 run-off for instance as the difference between the NDC that won the Presidential Elections and the NPP after the Tain re-run was only 0.94%.⁵

As indicated earlier, the framers of Ghana's 1992 Constitution opted for the WTA as the general formula for the selection of leaders. In particular, article 50 clause 1 (a) prescribes the selection of parliamentary candidates through a simple First-Past-The Post or Plurality voting system. And in Presidential elections, article 63 clause 3 prescribes the Majoritarian System as a formula for selecting the President of the Republic (Ayelazuno, 2011). Generally, the WTA as a formula for selecting leaders is also used for local and/or national elections in 43 of the 191 countries of the United Nations, including Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania, Swaziland, Singapore, Nigeria, Malaysia, Dominica, Botswana, Ethiopia, Barbados, India, France, Nepal, Pakistan, Malawi, Mexico, among a host of other countries.⁶ These countries have opted for WTA as formula for selecting leaders for several reasons that may not be interrogated for now because that is not the focus of this paper. However, one paramount factor that cannot be glossed over is that generally, it is a very simple, less complicated formula for selecting leaders and very much suitable for homogenous and developing countries where literacy rates are low and complex issues regarding electoral formulae could be recipe for electoral fraud and chaos (Ball and Peters, 2005). The framers of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana may have been mindful of the nascent nature of Ghana's democracy and the literacy rate in prescribing the WTA as an electoral formula for the nation. Indeed, educational levels were low and over 60% of the population lacked basic literacy and numeracy skills at the time the 1992 Constitution was being drafted.⁷

Two key challenges of this system in Ghana must be pointed out. First, the First-Past-the Post system, could likely result in minority rule, particularly when more than two political parties or candidates contest an election. Secondly, the majoritarian system has some major flaws which can, potentially, jeopardize the fragile electoral peace that has endured since 1992. It gives extra and strong incentive to the two dominant parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to engage in crude ethnic politics to win even when they have lost in the majority of the ten regions. Again, by turning the whole country into a single-member constituency, regardless of its ethno-regional divisions, the votes of minority regions could become insignificant in electing the president, a dynamic that can lead to political exclusion and, subsequently, conflict (Ayelazuno, 2011).

³ See more details on this at: <http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/alternative-vote/#sthash.CQSyfi5x.dpuf>

⁴ See more details of rejected ballots since 1992 at www.ec.gov.gh

⁵ Ibid

⁶ See full list of countries that uses the Winner-Takes-All formula is selecting leaders at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plurality_voting_system#Examples_of_plurality_voting

⁷ For more details on this, see <http://www.futuresforkidsghana.org/education-in-ghana>

2.1. Defining Winner-Takes-All Politics

Winner-Takes All in Ghana is not merely an electoral formula for determining winners in elections but also a political mechanism for facilitating the evaluative inclusion and exclusion of individuals, groups and classes of persons. It entails "state capture"⁸ or the partisan monopolization of state resources, facilities and opportunities, as well as the exclusion of political opponents from national governance. Since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1992, WTA politics has been a divisive syndrome that confers certain exclusive rights to top party echelon and apparatchiks after elections to the neglect of the rest of the citizenry (Gyampo, 2010). Generally, post-electoral political transitions are the most stressful moments for many developing nations. Victorious political parties after elections quickly "sweep the political and economic stakes" of the state as they consolidate themselves in power (Abotsi, 2013). The process of state capture moves *in tandem* with the ruthless perpetration of a regime of victimization and recrimination against political "enemies" in opposing political parties and their associates in business, industry and commerce (ibid). The key effects of this anti-democratic and inhumane system of political transition include compulsory retirements; dismissals; termination of appointments; cancellations and withholding of entitlements; forcible ejections from duty-post accommodation; wanton seizure of state vehicles and property in the care of political opponents by party apparatchiks without recourse to due process of law; reckless abrogation of contracts; and wanton persecution of certain real and perceived political opponents. These negative tendencies are what many Ghanaians perceive as symptoms of the Winner-Takes-All Politics.

It is also a political sub-culture that excludes all other Ghanaians who are not part of the ruling party from national governance and decision making in a manner that polarizes the nation and dissipates the much needed talents and brains for national development. In effect, one omnibus feature and result of WTA politics is the "dangerous feeling of exclusion" from the governance process by those who are not part of the ruling party/government (Dennis, 2007). It has been aptly argued that for the sake of responsiveness and political accountability, it may not be a sustainable proposal to call for "a purely all-inclusive governance system" where virtually "everybody across the political divide" is included in the governance process⁹. Nonetheless, the visible and palpable feeling of exclusion from the governance process by those who are not members of the party in power often associated with WTA politics cannot also be part of good governance. Unfortunately, this phenomenon has characterized all the regimes of Ghana's Fourth Republic. Incoming governments have used their victory to signal a new "era" and the fact of their control over power and resources. As has oftentimes been the case under all regimes in the Fourth Republic, the assumption of political authority has been used as means of demonstrating control and the consequent marginalization of perceived political opponents from access to key resources and occupation of certain offices (Abotsi, 2013).

3. What Causes WTA Politics?

There could be several factors responsible for WTA politics in Ghana and in the view of some Ghanaians, the root cause lies in the nation's Constitution. However in this paper, we argue that the 1992 Constitution of Ghana cannot be fully culpable for the Winner-Takes-All politics. At least in the US, UK, Canada and France, where the WTA electoral formula is used, there is no serious evidence of public complaint about the WTA politics and the feeling of exclusion by those who are not part of the ruling party (Dyck, 2006). Ghana's 1992 Constitution, just as those of some advanced countries, provides some countervailing checks against winner-takes-all politics. For instance, the legislature is expected to play an oversight role over the exercise of power by the executive. Whether these checks are being rendered ineffective or not would be a subject for another discussion. However, it is a truism that these checks have been provided for by the 1992 Constitution and the selection of WTA as an electoral formula was never meant to be translated into a divisive political problem after elections. What ought to be pointed out is that in a fledgling democracy like Ghana, politics tend to be a zero-sum game. Indeed, political power grants "ATMs on the verandas of those who gets them."¹⁰ Consequently, there is often the desire on the part of politicians to strengthen their hold over power through a variety of compensatory schemes and tactically systematic means of depriving and excluding political opponents of all resources, entitlements and positions and ultimately weakening them (Abotsi, 2013; Linton and Southcott, 1998). Through this, incoming governments are able to "fulfill electoral promises of providing for their followers, and exerting flexing power against opponents" (Abotsi, 2013). This is the crux of the matter.

⁸ The author is grateful to Prof Ken Agyemang Attafuaah, acting Dean of the Central University Law School for this view

⁹ The author is grateful to Professor Aaron Mike Oquaye, Political Scientist and Former Deputy Speaker of Parliament of the Republic of Ghana for this view. According to him, it would be difficult to locate who is responsible for what and who must be accountable to Ghanaians when all across the political divide are made part of the ruling government.

¹⁰ The author is grateful to Prof. Kwamena Ahwoi, of the GIMPA School of Governance and Leadership, for this view

4. Will Proportional Representation Be A Solution?

Many Ghanaians have called for the adoption of the Proportional Representation (PR) as a solution to the feeling of exclusion and marginalization associated with WTA politics by those political actors, ethnic groups, etc who are often defeated in elections. It is feared that, if not checked, the feeling of exclusion and marginalization could be a recipe for political conflict and undermine national cohesion which is a necessary condition for development (Dyck, 2006). What then, is PR? Like the WTA formula, the PR is also a formula for selecting leaders into parliament. It is sometimes referred to as full representation, and, as an electoral formula, it aims at securing a close match between the percentage of votes that groups of candidates obtain in elections and the percentage of seats they receive usually in the legislature (Douglas, 1993; Linton and Southcott, 1998; Nicholson, 1992). The PR formula is used in over 70 countries throughout the world including Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Japan, Germany, Italy, South Africa, South Korea, Norway, Namibia, Liberia, Lesotho, Scotland, Poland, Spain, Sweden, etc.

Generally, there are two main forms of PR; namely, the Party List Formula and the Single Transferable Vote Formula. Under the Party List formula, the parties each list their candidates according to their priorities. In a closed list, voters vote for a list, not a candidate. Each party is allocated seats in proportion to the number of votes, using the ranking order on its list. In an open list, voters may vote, depending on the model, for one person, or for two, or indicate their order of preference within the list (Dyck, 2006). On the other hand, the Single Transferable Vote formula uses a system of preferential voting to determine the results of elections. A constituency elects two or more representatives per electorate. Parties tend to offer as many candidates as they most optimistically could expect to win. Voters mark their ballot, allocating preferences to their preferred ranking for some or all candidates. A successful candidate must achieve a quota, being the total number of votes received divided by the number of candidates to be elected plus one; i.e. in a nine member constituency the quota would be (the number of votes divided by 9) +1 (ibid). Only in a few cases is this achieved at the first count (O'Neill, 2006). For the second count, if a candidate wins an election, his surplus vote (in excess of the quota) is transferred to his voters' second choice; otherwise, the least popular candidate is eliminated and his votes redistributed according to the second preference shown on them. If there is more than one candidate who cannot get enough votes after the transfer of votes of least popular candidate, he will be eliminated too. This process continues for as many counts as are needed until all seats are filled either by the required number of candidates achieving a quota and being deemed to be elected or until there are only the number of candidates remaining as there are number of seats. Although the counting process is complicated, voting is clear and most voters get at least one of their preferences elected (ibid).

One key advantage of the PR system is that it promotes political inclusivity and gives a voice to the marginalized in the decision making process in a manner that ensures national cohesion and unity (Dennis, 2007). However, it has been criticized because it could encourage the unnecessary proliferation of groups, ethnicity and political parties (ibid). Again, the whole formula is highly complex and mathematical and may not lend itself to quick understanding by the ordinary politician or the masses. Its tendency to breed confusion, conflict and increase the percentage of spoilt ballots in a country like Ghana with a relatively low literacy rate and high incidence of rejected ballots in General Elections since 1992, cannot be under-estimated.

Nevertheless, in order to promote inclusive politics and reduce the feeling of marginalization associated with WTA politics, Ghana may opt for a Customized Variant of the PR by adopting and modifying the Party List formula. The Customized Variant may combine the features of the Party List formula with an Affirmative Action programme that ensures that representation includes marginalized groups such as women, youth and the disabled. In other words, under this Customized Variant, political parties in parliamentary elections would receive seats in proportion to the number of votes garnered during the elections. In this regard, votes cast for candidates in elections would not be deemed to have been wasted and the dangers of electing people who actually have support from only a small segment of the voter population may be checked. In addition, some arithmetic computations may be worked out by the Electoral Commission to determine the percentage of seats to be occupied by marginalized groups somewhat proportionate to their size and demographic strength in the population. This is crucial in ensuring proper representation and full inclusivity in the governance process in a manner akin to what pertains in other African jurisdiction. Through similar actions, Rwanda got many women included in its governance process at the parliamentary level (Colomer, 2003; Douglas, 1993; Handelman, 2006). Again in Kenya, there are deliberate affirmative arrangements to allocate some seats to young people in parliament as a way of dousing the feeling of marginalization and exclusion among them.¹¹ This system of representation is also known as qualitative representation in that it broadens the entire system and ropes in the vulnerable. Indeed, it introduces an Affirmative Action concept into the process of political representation.

In sum, PR could serve as an electoral formula as well as a consensus-building mechanism that fosters inclusion and minimizes the feeling of exclusion of large numbers of people simply because their preferred party or candidate

¹¹In Kenya, there are specific constitutional provisions that guarantee seats for young people in the Legislature. This is a deliberate measure to ensure the representation of youth interest in decision making. For example, Article 97 clause one (c) talks about the composition of their National Assembly including 12 members nominated by Parliamentary Parties according to their proportion of members of the National Assembly to represent the youth. Again, the Kenyan Senate also has membership that provides for youth representation while Article 100 clause one (c) of their constitution enjoins the legislature to enact laws to promote youth representation in parliament.

lost out in an election based on a simple majority. Nevertheless, the nation may not easily accept the idea of changing its electoral formula from WTA to PR. Indeed, there is the need for caution in advocating for the PR because of certain challenges and requirement that must be met before the PR is adopted. Generally, one major consideration for adopting PR is the level of fragmentation and heterogeneity among the population (Dyck, 2006). Many countries of Scandinavian origin that adopted the PR did so because they were heterogeneous and deeply fragmented. Their adoption of the PR was therefore crucial in addressing vote wastage and under-representation of marginalized groups (Handelman, 2006; Nicholson, 1992). In Ghana, one key argument advanced in support of the call for the adoption of the PR system is the exploitation of ethnicity and regionalism by politicians in a manner that undermines the nation's population homogeneity and marginalizes some ethnic groups (Frimpong, 2006). In this regard, ethnic undertones have manifested in voting patterns in the Northern, Volta and Ashanti regions since 1992.¹² If we were a truly homogenous country, why was President J.A. Kufuor criticized for appointing only one Ewe (Major Courage Quarshigah) as cabinet minister and chastised for presiding over an Akan-party? Why was President John Mahama criticized for appointing a number of his ministers and other officials from the Northern regions? It may be argued that to some Ghanaians the adoption of PR is suitable because the nation is fairly heterogeneous. As a result, any system that caters for political and ethnic minorities and provides such groups with some level of autonomy (even when they are not in charge), is acceptable.

Without down-playing the argument that Ghana is fairly heterogeneous and that the adoption of PR is suitable in promoting the interests of political and ethnic minorities, it has also been argued that Ghana is a relatively small unitary state with a fairly homogenous population and does not fully meet the requirements for the adoption of the PR system (Handelman, 2006; Shillington, 1992). There are about 92 ethnic groups in Ghana with the major ones being the Akan (49.1%), Ga-Adangbe (8.0%), Ewe (12.7%), Grunsi (2.8%), Guan (4.4%), Gurma, (3.9%), Mande-Busanga, (1.1%) and Mole Dagbani (16.5%).¹³ The ethnic diversity has nevertheless not seriously dented and compromised the homogenous nature of its population (Frimpong, 2006; Handelman, 2006). Again, in spite of the fact that recently ethnic-voting seems to be rearing its ugly head in voting patterns, the kind of divisive ethnic cleavages of the magnitude that warrants the adoption of PR is not what is witnessed in Ghana today (Chazan, 1982; Frimpong, 2006; Shillington, 1992). It is significant to note that even though Nigeria's population is heterogeneous with over 250 ethnic groups¹⁴, their adoption of federalism (akin to PR) has not solved the fragmentation and feeling of marginalization by some ethnic minorities (Handelman, 2006). In this regard, the call for PR as a solution to WTA politics may be simplistic. It may encourage an unnecessary proliferation of groups, ethnicity and political parties in a manner that could render the selection of representatives extremely difficult and prone to corrupt influences. Indeed, one major challenge likely to threaten the viability of the option to implement PR in a developing country like Ghana is the complex nature of the formula for selecting leaders that does not lend itself to quick understanding by the ordinary politician and the masses. Its tendency to breed confusion cannot therefore be under-estimated. Finally, as a developing country fighting poverty and under-development, the feeling of marginalization alone cannot be the basis for inclusion in the governance process without recourse to meritocracy, competence and capabilities of representatives in governance and decision-making (Douglas, 1993; Young, 1976).

5. Conclusion

This paper has analyzed the PR system as a possible alternative to WTA or FPTP and a solution to WTA politics. In this regard, the pitfalls and challenges of both systems have been critically examined. The paper has argued that the politics of WTA with its attendant marginalization of perceived political opponents and feeling of exclusion by those who are not part of government cannot be a healthy democratic practice. In Ghana, it amounts to an unnecessary centrifugal amalgamation of power¹⁵ by the President and ruling party in a manner that undermines constitutionalism, national cohesion and the drive towards democratic maturity. The adoption of PR may serve to reduce some of the negative tendencies associated with WTA politics given the feeling of marginalization by political and ethnic groups who do not belong to the ruling party. However, given the fledgling nature of Ghana's democracy, and the complexities associated with PR, the question that ought to be posed is whether the nation is ready for a change in its electoral formula. Was it out of wisdom or sheer oversight that the Constitution Review Commission in its report kept silent over the nation's electoral formula? If the status-quo is to be maintained, then the existence of some effective countervailing authority to bridle the exercise of power in a manner that ensures that whoever emerges victorious in an election "does not take it all" is crucial. To this, we shall turn our attention and consider in the subsequent series.

¹² See voting patterns at www.ec.gov.gh

¹³ Ghana Statistical Service Report (2000)

¹⁴ Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, has more than 250 ethnic groups. The most populous and politically influential ones are the:

Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, and Tiv 2.5%. See more details at <http://start.csail.mit.edu/startfarm.cgi?query=How+many+ethnic+groups+exist+in+Nigeria>.

¹⁵ The author is grateful to Prof Mike Oquaye, a Political Scientist and Former Deputy Speaker of Parliament of the Republic of Ghana for this view.

References

- Abotsi, E. K. (2013). 'Rethinking the Winner-Takes-All System'. *Paper Presented at a Constitutional Review Series Roundtable Organized by the IEA*. Accra.
- Ayelazuno, J. (2011). Ghanaian elections and conflict management: Interrogating the absolute majority electoral system. *Journal of African Elections*, 10(2): 22-53.
- Ball, A. R. and Peters, B. G. (2005). *Modern politics and government*. 7th edn: Palgrave Macmillan: New York.
- Chazan, N. (1982). Ethnicity and politics in Ghana. *Political Science Quarterly*, 97(3): 461-85.
- Colomer, J. (2003). *Political institutions*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Dennis, P. (2007). *The politics of voting*. Edmond Montgomery Publications: Toronto.
- Douglas, A. J. (1993). *Real choices/new voices: The case for proportional representation elections in the United States*. Columbia University Press: New York.
- Dyck, R. (2006). *Studying politics in Rand Dyck (ed.) studying politics: An introduction to political science*. Thomson Canada Ltd: Toronto.
- Frimpong, A. K. D. (2006). *Ethnicity, Democracy and Ghana's Election 2004" in Kwame Boafo-Arthur, ed. (2006) Voting for democracy in Ghana: The 2004 elections in perspective*. Freedom Publications: Accra. 1.
- Gyampo, R. E. V. (2010). Political apparatchiks and governance in Ghana's Fourth Republic. *Educational Research*, 1(11): 21-36.
- Handelman, H. (2006). *The challenge of third world development*. 4th edn: Prentice Hall: New Jersey.
- Linton, M. and Southcott, M. (1998). *Making votes count: The case for electoral reform*. Profile Books Ltd: London.
- Nicholson, R. J. (1992). *Proportional representation elections in Hong Kong*. New York Times: New York.
- O'Neill, B. (2006). *Democracy in action, political participation and citizens' power" in Rand Dyck (ed.) studying politics: An introduction to political science*. Thomson Canada Ltd: Toronto.
- Oquaye, M. (2014). Addressing the imbalance of power between the arms of government: A search for countervailing authority. *IEA Governance Newsletter, Forthcoming*.
- Shillington, K. (1992). *Ghana and the rawlings factor*. St Martin's Press: New York.
- Young, C. (1976). *The politics of cultural pluralism*. University of Wisconsin Press: Madison.