



Decentralisation and Corruption in the Forestry Sector

Moh. Fadli*

Department of Administrative Law, Faculty of Law, Universitas Brawijaya MT. Haryono St, No. 169, Malang, East Java, Indonesia

Joko Purnomo

Department of Government Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Brawijaya Jalan Veteran 65145, Malang, East Java, Indonesia

Abstract

Decentralisation aims to improve social welfare. However, the authority held by regional governments increases the opportunities for corruption in the forestry sector. The aim of this research is to elaborate on problematic decentralisation and corruption in the forestry sector; additionally, the study considers the change in forest management policy before, during, and after decentralisation in a discussion of the measures taken to eradicate regional corruption in the forestry sector. The findings indicate that holders of large amounts of capital are influential in politics, leading to legislation that favors individual interests over the welfare of low-income populations. The integrity and commitment of regional heads determine whether a region is corruption-free. The following could help reduce corruption that damages the environment within regional areas: (1) enforcing the commitment of regional heads to eradicating corruption; (b) strengthening the structure of law enforcement; and (c) strengthening community groups. It is recommended that the government enforce the integrity of regional heads and maintain an internal commitment in all areas to eradicating corruptors.

Keywords: Corruptor; Forestry sector; Decentralisation; Local level.



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1. Introduction

The connection between decentralisation and corruption has recently been discussed among researchers, policy makers, and the public. Since the reformation era in Indonesia, local governments have had the right to make regional regulations that govern human resources, industries, and strategic public services. One sector that is known to be prone to corruption is forestry.

Community and ecologically based legal reform (HUMA) indicates that Law Number 41 of 1999 concerning forestry contains some weaknesses: (a) ambiguity, vagueness regarding rights and obligations, and a lack of security in forest management; (b) reduced public access to the forest; (c) an imbalanced allocation of funds for the forests managed by the public, private corporations and the government; and (d) overlaps in area status (Arizona, 2008).

Furthermore, regional autonomy, as regulated in Law Number 23 of 2014 and amended to Law Number 9 of 2015 concerning regional governments, is provided to improve public welfare. However, wider authority does not always come with increased responsibility, which often results in rampant corruption, as is the case in the forestry sector.

From 2003–2016, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) handled at least 12 forestry-related corruption cases which yielded the following decisions (Caesar *et al.*, 2016):

1. Corruption was found in the development of a palm oil plantation on one hectare of land in East Kalimantan and the issuance of a permit to utilise wood in 1999-2002.
2. In the issuance of a business permit for the utilisation of wood forest products in an industrial forest (IUPHHK-HT) from 2001 – 2006, all companies and parties involved received gifts.
3. In a budget proposal for the procurement of an integrated radio communication system by the Ministry of Forestry from 2007 – 2008, some amount of money was given to the members of commission IV of the House of Representatives and to officials of the Forest Department.
4. In a proposal to convert the protected forest of Air Telang beach in the Regency of Musi Banyuasin in South Sumatera to develop Tanjung Api-Api Harbour, some amount of money was requested and received by members of the House of Representatives.
5. The Regent of Siak issued business permits to several companies for the utilisation of wood products from a forest plantation from 2001 – 2003 in the Regency of Siak.
6. A Bribe was given to a Regent of Buol Amran Battallipu concerning the process of cultivation rights of a plantation on behalf of PT. Cipta Cakra Murdaya or PT Hardaya Inti Plantation.
7. Gifts were received for the recommendation of a forest area exchange in the Regency of Bogor on behalf of PT. Bukit Jonggol Asri and the Regent of Bogor named Rachmat Yasin as a suspect.
8. A proposal concerning forest conversion in the Province of Riau in 2014 was revised.
9. Protected forests in Bintan Buyu in the Regency of Bintan, Riau, were converted.

10. Muhammad Al Amien Nasution, a member of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia from 2004 – 2009, was involved in extortion regarding the procurement of a geodetic geographic positioning system (GPS) in the Forestry Planology Agency (BAPLAN).
11. Integrated Radio Communication Procurement (SKRT) for part of the 69 budget of the Forestry Department, 2006 – 2007.
12. A business permit was issued to 9 companies in the Province of Riau for the utilisation of wood products from a forest plantation.

To date, the loss to the state associated with cases handled by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is Rp. 2.2 trillion, with the value of bribes alone accounting for SGD 17,000 and Rp. 8.657 billion (Caesar *et al.*, 2016). However, based on the results of reviews conducted by the KPK, the potential wood product-related losses to the state since 2003 are predicted to reach approximately Rp. 598 – 799 trillion (Manurung, 2016).

Corruption in the forestry sector has reached a critical point. The individuals running wood businesses regularly bribe the people in charge to avoid the complex requirements for official permits for wood logging and loading. Moreover, the forestry law that forbids the logging of protected forests, small trees, and trees growing on hills or near rivers is commonly overlooked, which results in extensive environmental damage. Ironically, the Regional House of Representatives, which should stop this illegal action, instead imposes taxes on illegal logging, in effect supporting the corruption and environmental damage (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

The current Ministry of Environment (2016) has indicated that the deforestation rate has increased to 2.4 million ha per year. The forests in Java are projected to be gone by 2020. The forests in Bali-Nusa Tenggara only account for 0.08 million ha; those in Maluku, 2.37 million ha; those in Sulawesi, 7.20 million ha; those in Sumatera, 7.72 million ha; those in Kalimantan, 21.29 million ha; and those in Papua, 33.45 million ha (Sumargo *et al.*, 2009). This rapid deforestation is caused by illegal logging (60%), conversion (22%), road development (16%), and mining (0.6%) (Ubbe, 2013). The available data suggest that illegal logging is the main factor contributing to deforestation. This highlights the lack of law enforcement and the inefficient application of the law in Indonesia.

The *adat* law community, as the closest entity to the forest, is expected to maintain forest conservation, but the rights of those in the *adat* community are often overlooked. The government can easily seize forest land traditionally governed by *adat* simply because the state believes it has the right to give forest resources to enterprises. Moreover, regional governments argue that the wood produced by the forests can provide more regional revenue, a statement that supports decentralisation. This assumption by the state leads to the issuance of permits for logging, which certainly leads to more extensive deforestation (Siswanto and Wardojo, 2006).

Therefore, regional-level corruption must be eradicated immediately to stop the losses to state. Regional officials involved in corruption must be sanctioned without exception. As natural resources, it is expected that the forests of Indonesia can be utilised by the public for the sake of social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

2. Forest Management: Past and Present

2.1. Securing Forest Management by Adat

In 1950, Indonesia was rich with forests; trees covered 80 to 95% of the total forest areas. The forest cover was predicted to be approximately 170 million ha and included primary forests and secondary forests, as well as coffee, tea and rubber plantations (Siswanto and Wardojo, 2006).¹

The forests were well protected and maintained by *adat* law communities under *adat* values, and no exploitation was attempted. The existence of *adat* law communities is acknowledged in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Article 18B Paragraph (2), which states that the state recognises and respects traditional communities along with their traditional customary rights as long as these communities and rights remain in existence and are in accordance with societal development and the principles of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and are regulated by law.

Generally, the principles of *adat* wisdom in maintaining and managing *adat* forests involve the following:

- a. Living in harmony with nature and maintaining balance in the ecosystem.
- b. The communal management of particular *adat* forest areas that are exclusively maintained and protected from damage caused by *adat* people.
- c. Having an *adat* government and mechanisms for settling disputes in the *adat* community, especially disputes concerning forest management, through *adat* discussion.
- d. Having mechanisms for the distribution of tasks and the imposition of sanctions for excessive forest utilisation either by *adat* people or external sectors.
- e. Ensuring the equal distribution of crops to prevent social conflict (Nababan, 2008).

These principles illustrate that the *adat* law community strives to live in harmony with nature and maintain relationships with others and tends to avoid any potential societal inequalities.

The government is also aware of the importance of *adat* law communities in maintaining forests. The Ministry of Forestry has designated the community empowerment programme as a priority programmes by delegating rights to the communities living within forest areas; these rights include the rights to use the forests as a source of forestry for the community (Hkm), as village forests (HD) and as community forest plantations (HTR). A target of up to 500,000 hectares per year for Hkm and HD has been allocated in the National Medium-term Development Plan (RPJMN) (Kemitraan, 2012).

¹ Based on record from government of Dutch East Indies. In 1939 it recorded that large-scale plantation accounted for about 2.5 millions ha of area (exploited) where only 1.2 millions ha of the area was planted.

To more clearly understand the role of *adat* law communities as forest guardians, the following *adat* communities are presented as examples of successful forest management:

2.1.1. Adat Community of Kuntu

The *adat* community of Kuntu (Kuntu Caliphate) lives in the Regency of Kampar in the Province of Riau (Tim Universitas Riau, 2006). In the *adat* law of the Kuntu, there are resources that are considered high value and those that are considered of lesser value. The forest is regarded as a high value resource and is not for sale or purchase as it is owned communally (Anonymous, 2012).

Furthermore, the *adat* community of Kuntu also follows a rule known as *adat* forest or forbidden forest. This type of forest serves as a natural source of balance and a home to traditional herbal plants. Efforts to manage forbidden forest or *ulayat* land, whether management rules or harvest times, must be discussed. Those who remove trees face an *adat* sanction in the form of a fine, and they may be expelled from the village if the wrongdoing is serious enough. The sanction must be determined in an *adat* discussion (Anonymous, 2012).

2.1.2. Adat Community of Badui

The people of Badui (the Kanekes people) are traditional Sunda living in Kanekes village in the District of Leuwidamar, Regency of Lebak, the Province of Banten. The Badui people are categorised based on the region in which they live: Badui Dalam (Inner Badui; Tangtu region), Badui Luar (Outer Baduy; Penamping), and the Dangka region (Iskandar, 2012).

Unlike in Badui, incidents of forest degradation and illegal logging in Indonesia as a whole are growing in number and have extended to several regions. The forest where the Badui people live is still pristine and densely covered with vegetation. The people of Baduy have a forbidden forest of 3000 hectares (ha) that can only be accessed during a particular month on a particular day. Although the development of Baduy seems traditional, slow, and outdated, ecologically, the people of Baduy have implemented the concept of sustainable development (Fadli, 2017).

The people of Badui, especially those of Badui Dalam, abide norms and *adat* rules in their social lives. To manage the forest, the people of Badui strongly cling to the advice of their great grandparents. Some principles of this advice concerning forest management are as follows: (a) mountains must not be destroyed and (b) valleys must not be destroyed. The people of Baduy believe that the mountains and the valleys in which forests lie are the core of the earth and need to be protected.

To maintain the environment, the people of Badui divide their lands by function: lands for housing, lands for agriculture and lands for permanent forest. The space for housing and agriculture is used for dwelling and farming for sustenance and income. Meanwhile, permanent forests, such as protected forests and those protected by the village, are those located near sacred spring water or mountains (Senoaji, 2011).

There are several forests in the area of Baduy, such as Sasaka Domas and Arca Domas, two of which are restricted in terms of access. Only Puun Ciebeo and its people are allowed to visit the forests during the 2 months of Kalima (May – June) after the paddy harvest and on *seba* in the month of *Safar*, or New Year. The forests in the areas of Sasaka Domas and Arca Domas are cultivated by the people of Badui Dalam and serve as places of natural conservation, flora and fauna habitats, hierological systems, and religious places for the people of Baduy Dalam through the generations (Iskandar, 2012).

2.1.3. Adat Community of Ammatoa

The *adat* community of Ammatoa occupies Tana Toa village, District of Kajang, Regency of Bulukumba. The Ammatoa community is divided into two communities, one in Tana Kamase-Masea and one in Tana Kuasayya. The community of Ammatoa still obeys the system of cultural values inherited by their ancestors. The people of Ammatoa tend to limit new things or even entirely reject them (Dassir, 2008).

In maintaining and managing the forests, the people of Ammatoa refer to the *adat* of Ammatoa (*Boronna I bohe*), which divides the forest into three zones:

- a. Sacred Forest (Borong Karama). This is the first zone of the *adat* forest. Access to this zone is believed to be forbidden (Kasipali) because the flora and fauna within are also protected. Borong Karama are only open to the people of Ammatoa and *adat* members during an *adat* ceremony (inauguration of Ammatoa *Pa'nganroang*).
- b. Border Forest (Borong Battasayya). This is the second zone after Borong Karama. Borong Karama and Borong Battasayya are bordered by a path that leads the Ammatoa and *adat* members to Borong Karama during ritual community ceremonies. Borong Battasayya is located in the pa'rasangeng Irajaja forest. The Ammatoa communities in Tana Kamase-masea or Tana Kuasayya are allowed to take wood from Borong Battasayya under certain conditions.
- c. Borong Luarayya is a community forest without the right of ownership. Muh Sain (a son of Amma Galla) argues that this forest is located in the territory of the Ammatoaan community with an area of ± 100 Ha. People may take wood from this forest under the same conditions that apply to obtaining wood from Borong Battasayya.
- d. The management and conservation system of the forests of the *adat* community of Ammatoa in Kajang are regulated by *adat* law called the Pasang ri Kajang Guidelines. Regarding the connection between humans and nature, the Pasang ri Kajang Guidelines are more focused on forest conservation.

2.2. Forest Management by the Central Government and Regional Governments

In terms of governance, Law Number 23 of 2014 on Regional Regulation classifies governance into three categories: absolute government², concurrent government³, and general government.⁴ In terms of decentralisation, the concurrent government within the regional authority is further divided into 2 categories which is reflected in Article 11 Paragraph (1), namely: compulsory government⁵ and elective government.⁶ The forestry sector is included in the elective government in either the province or the regency/city.

In general, the central government holds the following authority: (a) forest planning; (b) forest management; (c) conservation of natural resources and their ecosystems; (d) education and training, workshops and community empowerment in forestry; (e) watershed management; and (f) forestry control. The government of a province holds authority similar to that of the central government but is not authorised to plan or control forests. Meanwhile, the authority of the government of a regency / city is limited in scope to the management of forest parks.

This article is focused on the authority to manage forests, which is held by the central government and provincial governments. The scope of the authority of the central government in forest management involves the following:

- a. Forest management
- b. Forest management planning
- c. Forest utilisation
- d. Forest rehabilitation and reclamation
- e. Forest protection
- f. Forest product management and administration
- g. Forest management for specific purposes (KHDTK).

Meanwhile, the provincial government holds the authority to carry out the following:

- a. Governance of forest management units, except for the forest conservation management unit (KPHK).
- b. Management planning of the forest management units, except for the forest conservation management unit (KPHK).
- c. Forest utilisation in production forests and protected forests including the following:
 1. Forest use
 2. Utilisation of non-wood forest products
 3. Forest product levy
 4. Involvement of environmental services, except the use of carbon storage and/or carbon absorption
- d. Forest rehabilitation outside state forest areas
- e. Protection of protected forests and production forests
- f. Management of non-wood forest products
- g. Management of wood forest products with production capacity below 6000 m³ annually
- h. Management of KHDTK for the sake of religion.

The law of the regional government serves as the basis for regional areas to manage their forestry sectors on their own. Regional governments can also draft regional regulations to elaborate on policies in accordance with the scope of their authority but still in compliance with the policy of the central government. In addition, regional governments are authorised to generate revenue, to receive funds from higher levels of government and to determine their own regular budget and investments, which is commonly known as fiscal decentralization (Fadli, 2015).

In regional areas, there are three levels of fiscal decentralisation, defined according to the degree of independence in decision making:

- (1) Delegating responsibility within the authority of the central government to institutions in regional areas.
- (2) Cooperating with institutions in which the regional government serves as a government representative to run particular functions on behalf of the government.
- (3) Decentralisation regarding a specific situation and the authority to make decisions related to this situation in regional areas (Fadli, 2015).

Because the regional government is given the authority to set budget regulations, policies implemented by regional governments often do not consider the rights of the people residing in or near the forest areas. In recent years, through regional autonomy, regional heads have issued a variety of permits for wood utilisation (IPK) in several areas in Indonesia, and some communities living within the forests were expelled from the areas as a result. Therefore, it is understandable when Bernard L. Tanya starts to be concerned about a condition in which national law is perceived as a burden by local communities (Arizona, 2008).

² Absolute government is the government that is entirely under the authority of central government such as: politics of foreign affairs, defence, security, judicature, monetary and national fiscal, and religion. See: Article 9 Paragraph (2) and Article 10 Paragraph (1).

³ Affairs related to Concurrent government are divided into Central and Provincial Government and Regional Government of Regency/City: See: Article 9 Paragraph (3).

⁴ General Government Affairs are under the authority of President as the leader of government. See: Article 9 Paragraph (5).

⁵ Compulsory government affairs are related to standard services and government affairs that are not related to the standard services. See: Article 11 Paragraph (2).

⁶ Elective government affairs are those held by regional areas according to the potential of the regional areas. See: Article 1 Number 15.

3. Decentralisation Issues and Corruption in the Forestry Sector

Corruption is inseparable from law, politics, and economics. Richard Posner once stated, “*The political order is the key system through which economic approaches to the law can enter into the economy and society through the law-making*” (Zamboni, 2008). However, in reality, the decisions made by the government in Indonesia are mostly influenced by large private sectors⁷, which leads to increased corruption. Corruption may occur under either a female or male ruler. It may happen in areas with symmetric or asymmetric power and in areas with specific characteristics or general characteristics. Moreover, the potential for corruption can be categorized as secure, alert, or prone.

David Dollar argues that having more females involved in the government could eliminate corruption (Dollar *et al.*, 1999). However, this view is not always correct because females do not understand politics and bureaucracy as well as men do. In other words, corruption is still likely to occur despite the presence of females in government (Fadli, 2013).

Corruption is still likely in areas of asymmetric decentralisation⁸; as Lord Acton stated, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. This statement is considered as mostly true as the regions with the most authority always have the potential for corruption (Fadli, 2014a).

Furthermore, the Province of East Java has specific and general characteristics, but the its risk regarding corruption in 2011 was secure in at least 8 regions, at the alert level in 29 regions, and at the prone level in only 1 region (Fadli, 2015). This shows that the potential for corruption in East Java remains high.

Research conducted in East Java, especially in Regency A, Regency B and City C, shows a high tendency toward corruption resulting from the absence of regional regulations that specifically target criminal corruption, weak institutions, and weak public participation (Fadli, 2016).

Theoretically, political policy is affected by many parties, either those in an organisation or other stakeholders. The interaction among parties in the political process is implemented through legislation (Zamboni, 2008). Given that the potential for corruption is caused by the interaction between governments and influential private sectors, it is important that the connection between business and politics be studied. Two main aspects are in the spotlight: (a) The involvement of governments (state, politics) in business (market) and (b) the involvement of business (market) in politics (government, state) (Marijan, 2010).

From the date of Indonesia’s independence to the reformation era, economic policy has been implemented. Yahya Muhamimi opines that the economic policy in Indonesia was a system of patronage from 1950 – 1980, in which businessmen with a close relationship with the government tended to gain considerable profits as a result of government policies (Marijan, 2010).

In the reformation era, decentralisation divided state power into the central government and regional governments. Through the Law of Regional Regulation, most government tasks are delegated to regional governments, resulting in an imbalance of the political power held by central and regional bodies. Kacung Marigan argues that stronger political patronage, weak state power, and stronger power from outside the state have brought Indonesia to a *patrimonial oligarchic state*, in which the powers controlling certain markets receive much more profits than others. The holders of large amounts of capital are usually profit motivated and can influence political policy in such a way that legislation tends favour big business over low-income populations. This does not mean that the integrity of all regional leaders in Indonesia is bad; however, it does mean that the integrity and commitment of regional leaders determine the status of corruption in a region. Both integrity and commitment are essential for developing corruption-free regions.

Moreover, Indonesia tends to have a democracy of limited scope, which provides more access for those with large amounts of capital and can also be influenced by other powers (Marijan, 2010).

This situation is related to the number of troublesome regional regulations, some of which have been annulled. Up to June 2016, there have been 3,143 regional regulations annulled, of which 1,765 were annulled by provinces or regencies/cities; 100 regulations were annulled/revised by the Ministry of Home Affairs (2016); and 1,267 regional regulations of a regency/city were annulled/revised by the Governor.

There are at least 4 reasons for the annulment of a regional regulation or the regulation of a regional head: (1) Impeding investment (permit, levy, business services, permit to build, contribution from a third party, and so forth); (2) inconsistency with higher law and common interests; (3) inconsistency with Law Number 23 of 2014 on Regional Government and the Decisions of the Constitutional Court (water resources, telecommunication towers, regionally owned enterprises (BUMD), and task diversion); and (4) regional regulations or other regulations of regional heads that are considered unnecessary because they comprise ordinary societal norms (Agustino, 2017).

Moreover, annulled regulations tend to be issued to increase regional revenue, whereas higher-level regulations are sometimes broken or common interests and environmental sustainability are overlooked. Surprisingly, some regional regulations trigger corruption for the benefit of individuals or corporations (Yuntho, 2012).

Corruption in the forestry sector can be classified into (1) corruption among elites (grand corruption) and (2) corruption committed en masse by the bureaucratic apparatus (petty corruption). Grand corruption is performed by high-level officials with the ability to influence decision- and policy-making, and such corruption usually involves large amounts of money. Petty corruption, however, is committed to avoid the consequences of policies. This type of corruption involves low-level officials, and the values involved are small. However, in practice, small-scale corruptions sometimes turn into larger corruptions (Yuntho, 2012).

⁷ Based on Global Corruption Barometer 2013, the influence of businessmen was huge for government, accounting for 32%.

⁸ Asymmetry Decentralisation is set in Yogyakarta, Jakarta, and Aceh, the Province and Papua and West Papua.

Table-1. Types of Corruption in the Forestry Sector, Categorised into Grand Corruption and Petty Corruption (Greenomics, 2008)

Grand Corruption	Petty Corruption
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Companies give political funds to groups of parties, political parties or military officials to get concessions or extended periods of forest management. 2. High-level officials or politicians interfere with the taxes and levies imposed on forest products. 3. Loans, facilities, or tax breaks are provided to crony companies. 4. Permits are given to companies that violate standard regulations. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Bribing to manipulate regarding volume and diameter requirements in logging. 2. Bribing to avoid supervision and sanctions related to concession contracts. 3. Bribing people in charge for easier timber movement (illegal movement of timber). 4. Bribing people responsible for monitoring companies' compliance with sustainable management regulations or pollution control provisions. 5. Permitting logging practices in protected forests.

Both direct and indirect factors result in corruption in the forestry sector (Greenomics, 2008):

- a. Systems and regulations in taxation, banking, finance, and permits.
- b. Public policy such as budget allocation, development policy, and public services for political groups (*discretionary policy decisions*).
- c. Legal supervision and enforcement regarding the proportion of authority given without accountability and the minimum sanction and punishment for corruptors.

Indirect factors involve the following (Greenomics, 2008):

- a. Dysfunctional institutional factors, including non-transparent procedures, accountability systems, and monitoring and evaluation.
- b. Absence or unavailability of sanctions or punishments for corruptors.
- c. Low human resource quality at the bureaucratic level because there is no meritocracy or reward to benefit those who do not participate in corruption practices.

According to the Corruption Policy Review, the Corruption Eradication Commission shows uncertainty in the definition of forest area in Law Number 41 of 2009. This situation has prompted certain parties to take sides in a way that may help people avoid sanctions; additionally, this uncertainty can encourage attempts to legalise illegal logging. All these problems may be caused by the ambiguity surrounding who has the authority to manage the forest areas: the central government or the regional government responsible for spatial planning (Indonesia Corruption Watch, n.d).

However, according to the review results of the Planning and Management Systems of Forest Monitoring, Corruption Eradication Commission (2013) identified a tendency toward corruption resulting from uncertainty regarding rights and investment opportunities, weak regulations, and the absence of availability of forest areas. The research results found 17 systematic problems in the following areas: regulation (9 findings), institutional factors (3 findings), governance (4 findings) and human resource management (1 finding).

The corruption is then hidden by money laundering, which is primarily done by cooperatives. Some common money laundering activities are listed as follows (Manthovani, 2018):

1. Account credits proposed to banks. Companies that illegally cut trees will usually put the money earned from selling the wood in other bank accounts affiliated with the companies.
2. Buying life insurance policies. Another way to hide the corruption is by buying a high-cost life insurance policy. This is done as part of the placement process.
3. Cash courier. Some companies smuggle some amount of cash, making it difficult to trace back.
4. Integration process. This step is performed when the criminal act being committed is seen as safe enough to go to the next step; i.e., the money laundering is integrated by a company into a legal business transaction to hide the traces of corruption.

Other actions may be performed to eradicate corruption, as follows:

1. Blockading the internal bureaucracy that causes corruption cases to be trapped in bureaucracy and law enforcement.
2. Lawsuits concerning laws regulating corruption that should be handled by an institution.
3. Court rulings based on the selection of a particular perspective that benefits the criminal or impedes the process of eradicating corruption (Mahfud, 2011).

Therefore, it is important to directly or indirectly prevent factors that contribute to corruption and to stop any opposition that is in favor of corruption.

4. Eradicating Ecology-Damaging Corruption in the Decentralisation Era

Corruption is the main factor impeding social welfare. Some measures have been taken to eradicate corruption with the support of the government. However, corruption with certain motives and varied forms and types is difficult to abolish. Interestingly, the corruptors are those who hold power and are well-educated and wealthy (Fadli, 2014b). Therefore, comprehensive measures should be taken to sever the links of corruption, especially that at the regional level.

To solve the problem of ecology-damaging corruption in regional areas, the following solutions are provided:

4.1. Solidifying Regional Leaders' Commitment to Eradicating Corruption

Regional leaders' commitment determines the success of eradicating corruption at the local level. Strengthening good governance principles becomes the key factor in stopping practices that are not transparent in the process of issuing permits regarding forest management. In addition, the government must be committed to transparency in terms of information on spatial planning execution. In the process of creating regional governments and executing regulations, it is essential to keep anticipating corruption. In each stage, government officials must be committed to directly or indirectly minimising the chance of corruption. There are four principles for implementing anti-corruption measures: (a) administration, (b) professionalism, (c) justification, and (d) public participation (Purnawan, 2014).

4.2. Solidifying the Structure of law Enforcement

The police department and prosecutor general must develop an enquiry process to ensure that those investigated include not only low-level officials but also high-level officials. Although KPK is serious in handling corruption in the forestry sector, the handling of these cases does not seem satisfactory. The majority of the culprits involved in corruption are given small sanctions. Adequate punishments that have a deterrent effect are urgently needed to eradicate corruption.

Law enforcement must be maintained and must not be diminished, and there must be no more opportunities for potential corruption (Fadli, 2018). Several reforms in the law enforcement process related to corruption cases that have taken place at the local level must be strengthened. The following measures may be taken (Rinaldi *et al.*, 2007):

- a. Strengthening collaboration among institutions involved in law enforcement and anti-corruption at the local level by including law enforcement agencies in legal training and anti-corruption movements for the relevant societies;
- b. Setting indicators of how long the legal process should take at each stage of the process;
- c. Based on the Circular Letter of the Attorney General's Office, it is compulsory for the district attorney to hold preliminary hearings in an alleged corruption case with anti-corruption organisations and to facilitate community organisation to hold public examination regarding the court ruling.

4.3. Strengthening the Participation of the Public

The implementation of a decentralised system must be supported by public monitoring. The government has issued Government Regulation Number 71 of 2000 concerning Procedures of Community Participation and Award Presentation for the Prevention and Eradication of Criminal Corruption to increase community participation. However, *adat* law community participation has not been specifically regulated.

The author proposes that the unification of people in the pursuit of eradicating corruption in the forestry sector can be categorised into 2 areas: solidifying *adat* law communities for more effective mechanism control *in situations* in which parliamentary control and internal supervision are indeed a part of the corruption issues. With the recognition of the *adat* law community through regional regulation, the sense of belonging of the community is raised, which is expected to lead to minimal corruption.

On the other hand, community organisation needs to be encouraged to promote corruption eradication, in which the community participation should involve: (a) support to improve knowledge about local budget management, legal processes and investigative capabilities for corruption cases and advocacy; (b) support given to strengthen networks among anti-corruption organisations at the local level and networks among several bodies and anti-corruption organisations at the national level; (c) support in role distribution for national anti-corruption organisations to continue monitoring and applying pressure in legal processes that have been encouraged by local actors (Rinaldi *et al.*, 2007).

5. Conclusion

1. Holders of large amounts of capital, who are usually profit-motivated, could influence political policy, which leads to the creation of legislation that tends to favour certain businessmen instead of poor communities. The integrity and commitment of regional heads determines the corruption status of an area. Strong integrity supported by strong commitment is essential for realising corruption-free regions.
2. Corruption eradication measures must be comprehensive. The eradication of ecology-damaging corruption in regional areas can be strengthened by the following: (a) strengthening regional leaders' commitment to eradicating corruption; (b) strengthening the structure of law enforcement; and (c) solidifying community organisation.

Recommendation

The government must strengthen the integrity of regional heads and maintain internal commitment in all areas to eradicate corruption. It is expected that the concerned interests concerned can be facilitated appropriately to achieve social welfare.

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