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On the Conflict of the End of History between Islamic Caliphate and Global Liberalism: From the Perspective of Thought and Public Opinion Leaders in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

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Abstract

This study aims to explore the opinions of thought and public opinion leaders in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, regarding the conflict of the end of history between Islamic caliphate and global liberalism. These two schools of thought were recently represented by the revolutions of the Arabic Spring in a number of Arab countries as well as the rising of political Islamic movements and the calls for overthrowing the so-called non-Islamic regimes. The uprisings of the Arab Spring started in Tunisia in 2011, calling for the return of the Islamic caliphate. To this end, the researcher conducted 9 interviews with a group of thought and public opinion leaders in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a country which lies at the heart of the Arab Spring events. The researcher used a historical approach and analyzed the interviews using an analytical descriptive approach, calculating the frequencies in the participants' responses. The results show that as far as the end of history is concerned, all interviewees agreed that there is a recent conflict between the model of Islamic caliphate, on the one hand, and the model of democratic liberalism represented by the dissertation of Francis Fukuyama, on the other. Since the conflict exists but relies on the interpretations of the concept of caliphate and the liberal perspective, there are some thinkers who believe that there is no contradiction between these two schools of thought. Their beliefs depend on the way by which each school of thought perceives its model, since there is no standardized Islamic model or standardized liberal model. Conversely, some thinkers believe that the conflict is Islamic-Islamic, rather than Islamic-liberal; thus, closing the door for diligence could be viewed as one reason for this internal conflict. Additionally, because variation rather than similarity is to be expected, conflict does follow. The participants also believe that the perception of caliphate is different from one political trend to another and is not within the religious sense of jihad among the armed political Islamic movements. Therefore, one of the most important recommendations suggested in this study relates to activating the role of the mosque and the church in society in a manner that surpasses the media which has the greatest effect on people's values, while taking into consideration modernism in all the fields that may contribute to the interest of the society, the necessity of respecting people's religious and ethnic backgrounds as well as national freedom. This is because plurality does not mean partition, rather it involves the enrichment of national unity, developing national culture, appreciating the efforts of people, rather than overlooking them, and finally exerting all efforts to make use of the experiences of others in all the domains that may benefit the interest of the society.

Keywords: Caliphate; Liberalism; Political Islamic movements; Jordan; Conflict.



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1. Introduction

In light of the changes the Arab countries have witnessed in general, and the Jordanian society in particular, starting from the smallest unit in the society (the family), and ending by the institutions of the civil society with their different forms, in addition to cultural globalism as an affecting ideology on these structures; the superiority of the liberal values over the communist values, which implies a unipolar dominance given the absence of another opponent, it was inevitable for the western countries to turn to a close opponent that has totally contradicting cultural and civilized values, i.e. Islam. In order to prevent the unity of the Islamic system due to the fact that it is different from the liberal model and objectives, western countries used two mechanisms, represented by the integration or transferring to universality through globalism, as well as dismantling that system from the inside which, in turn, resulted in disorder in the construction of many Islamic societies that became a commercial market for these countries. These destructive efforts resulted in the emergence of political Islamic movements, giving rise to the slogan "Islam is the solution". These movements started in Egypt and extended later to most eastern countries. This, in turn, evoked religious feelings among Arab citizens and tended to impose a new way for understanding religion and the way by which it is interpreted.

The process of converting religion into an issue entails putting it in its social, political and cultural context, as well as thinking of it as a political movement, rather than a mere fixed foundation. From this perspective, religion is not regarded as an abstract entity, but as representations that are repeated daily in the speeches of different actors. This is ascribed to the fact that religion is a general common aspect, while the representations are specified patterns that change based on the authority positions that the religious parties occupy in some Arab countries due to people's revolutions known as "the Arab Spring". It is well known that many of these slogans, which have been raised by Islamists over the past decades, have been subjected to scrutiny (Al-Kanabouri, 2014). These conditions collectively

contributed to the emergence of the phenomenon of political Islam. This phenomenon received more attention as a social cultural issue that is characterized as being complex. This complexity results from the intervention of certain aspects relating to religion and policy. Therefore, the phenomenon of political Islam is described as an interacting social political state, where religion is not considered as the real foundation of the current political Islam. Some researchers who are religious assume that western countries used the movements of political Islam for its benefit, while some other researchers suggest that there is no intellectual coincidence between the global cultural ideology and religious thought, represented by the movements of political Islam. This is because the latter serves the former indirectly; thus, perspectives and results vary accordingly ([Al-Mashaqebah and Aqeel, 2013](#)).

With the increasing ideologies affected by globalization and the return to the past of Islam, or the so-called (Islamizing), we are now confused between those who aim to develop Islamic thought and those who want to preserve what Muslim ancestors achieved, providing evidence from the four imams. However, the battle between these thoughts was not always fair. It is true that there was freedom in expressing opinions within this intellectual conflict, but it was not the norm, since many individuals were hostile towards the ideas of others, resorting to methods of threatening, physical abuse, killing and atonement ([Ahmed, 2007](#)).

2. Statement of the Problem and Research Questions

Perhaps the absolute confidence in science, which ravaged human history in successive recent decades, resulting in the inevitability of science which created what is known as the inevitability of history and technology as well as biological inevitability among others, affected people who trusted in science to become a substitute for religion, to the extent that they started questioning the validity of religion. Arab Muslims are not allowed to separate technology from the intellectual ideology and its associated performance. This is because Arab-Islamic thought in recent times faces a great challenge in the age of information technology; it is running around in circles in its attempt to search for the truth, within an actual reality and a virtual world in order to achieve security, happiness as well as mental and spiritual freedom. This psychological conflict lies inside Arab Muslims and it extends between their Islamic and secular ideologies. Consequently, the real and armed conflict starts when there is no intellectual communication between Islamists and secularists in a serious attempt, by either side, to establish its identity at the expense of the other ([Madkour, 2003](#)).

In this regard, Samuel Huntington classifies the world civilizations into four: Chinese, Hindu, Islamic, and Western civilizations. The distinctions between these civilizations lie in language, cultural history and religion. The latter is considered the central power that mobilizes people. Huntington suggests that Islam represents an issue that has no solution, especially in light of the rise of Islamic Awakening, which gave Muslims confidence in themselves and motivated them to recall their civilization and Islamic values, and in light of migration of Muslims to Europe and America and the tendency of many westerners to enter in Islamic religion ([Huntington, 1996](#)).

This reflects Huntington pessimistic view of the future and his hostility against Islam, which is evident in his book "Clash of Civilizations". This book has been criticized by many thinkers, such as Zaki Al-Milad, the founder of the theory of civilization dialogue, who suggested replacing clash by acquaintance and dialogue as a vision; one which he derived from the Holy Quran: "O mankind! We have created you from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the most honorable of you with Allah is that (believer) who has At-Taqwa" (AL-Hujurat 13). He notes that the problem between civilizations does not lie in the lack of dialogue, but in the lack of acquaintance ([Huntington, 1996](#)).

The problem of this study lies in the presence of cognitive mystery concerning the nature and justifications of the intellectual conflict between political Islam movements and cultural globalization in terms of their views relating to the optimal model for the end of history and as threatening factors to the Jordanian balanced social structure. In this structure, variation of attitudes and opinions between the historical religious perspective and the modernist perspective exists, leading to the decline of the religious density as a historical guidance for the Arab Islamic culture to be replaced by the modern culture of digits and information technology. This decline made humans cold and led to the relative abandonment of good values, such as cooperation and affinity with others regardless of financial issues and individual differences ([Al-Mahadeen, 2015](#)).

Drawing on the above background, this study aims to answer the following research questions:

- 1) To what extent do thought and public opinion leaders in Jordan perceive the intellectual difference between Islamists and liberalists regarding the optimal model for representing the end of history?
- 2) What are the consequences relating to the ideological conflict about the end of history?
- 3) How do Islamists express the ideological conflict pertaining to the end of history?

3. The Significance of the Study

The significance of the study lies in:

Firstly: The theoretical significance:

- a) Identifying and analyzing the points of intellectual conflict between cultural globalization as a positivist variable which is new to the Arab and Islamic intellectual construction as a cultural basis at the present time.
- b) Analyzing the factors that have been introduced to the Arab and Islamic world accompanying globalization and its consequences.
- c) Studying the effects of cultural globalization on the different structures within the study population, and discussing the results that shed light on these conflicts and its accompanying civilized components.

- d) The study aims to use the scientific theories in constructing the study and analyzing its results, with a clear emphasis on the theory of modernity and the consequences that follows.
- e) The results of this study are expected to contribute to intellectual, analytical, and field studies.

Secondly: The practical significance:

- a) This study is characterized by its originality, since there is lack of previous studies that address the Jordanian society, to the best of my knowledge.
- b) The results of this study are expected to be beneficial to social planners, economists, politicians, religious sociologists, security decision-makers and civil society organizations. This is due to the fact that it will assist them in finding appropriate social and legislative policies, resulting in the development of remedial and reform plans that aim to provide solutions to the problem under investigation.

4. The Objectives of the Study

This study aims at:

- a) Recognizing and analyzing the perspectives of thought and public opinion leaders in the Jordanian society regarding the intellectual difference between liberalist and Islamists relating to the optimal model to represent the end of history.
- b) Identifying the most important results on the ideological difference regarding the optimal model to represent the end of history between Islamic caliphate and global liberalism.
- c) Presenting the "Arab Spring" model as one of the models that represent the ideological conflict between liberalists and Islamists.

5. Key Terms

The caliphate (linguistically and idiomatically): means succeeded, succeed, and became his successor ... and the successor is the one who is chosen by his preceding successor, i.e. Caliph ([Ibn Manthor et al., 1955](#)). From another perspective, [Al-Zubaidi \(2008\)](#), suggests that succession refers to all those who succeed and come after those who passed away.

The Holy Quran uses the term "caliph" in its plural form to refer to some groups. However, this term has no relation to political institutions, and it was used twice. In the first citation, it refers to Adam (peace be upon him): "Verily, I am going to place (mankind) generations after generations on earth.". The other time, caliph refers to Dawood (peace be upon him): "O Dawood! Indeed, We [We] have made you a vicegerent in the earth". Most interpretations regarding these two verses revolve around the linguistic meanings, from successor to vicegerent ([Al-Tabari, 310 H](#)).

The caliphate is defined, procedurally, as the ruling system that is required and appealed by the political systems and political Islamic movements from their viewpoint.

Liberalism is defined, procedurally, as another area relating to secularism, which originally centers on freedom. The basic feature of liberalism is that everything in the liberal doctrine is changeable and controversial, and this case also applies to the absolute judgments of the Holy Quran. In particular, if the votes of the majority changed, the values and provisions would follow suit, and the constants would be replaced by new ones. Therefore, there is no absolute right in life, everything is changeable, and there is no absolute truth except for change.

6. Previous Studies and Theoretical Framework

6.1. Previous Studies

[Mustafa \(2002\)](#), conducted a study entitled: "The Dialogue of Civilizations in Light of Current International Relationships". The study aimed to answer the following questions: "Are the current international relationships prepared for a civilized dialogue between Muslims and the dominant Western powers?, Why do Western countries, after the Cold War, embrace the slogan of the clash of civilizations and plan based on it?, What is the origin of the relationships between civilizations? Is it war or peace?". These are questions that the researcher attempts to answer in her study, and she also argues that everyone agrees that there is a global crisis with a value-cultural dimension and that Islam is capable of presenting a perspective that contributes to legitimizing the vision that is being formulated for the world. [Mustafa \(2002\)](#), also proposes that Muslims need a non-apologetic speech, suggesting that the project of "the interaction between civilizations" should be based on the point of view of the Holy Quran. This is because Muslims need a speech that is derived from the Islamic foundations and characteristics, based on the good initiatives towards the other, so as to achieve balance in the vision which is considered the basis of effectiveness. The results of this critical view reveal how these ideas represent a recognition implying that the conflict is the approach of the West towards the world, in general, and towards Muslims, in particular. This is because the West considers them as a threat of a special nature, and this vision stems from the way of perceiving the civilized and cultural dimensions inherent in Islamic nation.

In his study, [Mirden \(2004\)](#), investigated the cultural conflict in international relationships between the West and Islam. The study aimed to identify the challenges of traditional patterns of culture, values and social norms in different parts of the world, following the state of collapse witnessed by the international system after the end of the Cold War. The study clearly emphasized the consideration of political Islam as one of the sensitive points of communicating with the West, with the existence of a cultural suspicion for the West regarding this issue. This is because the West links terrorism to Islam and considers that terrorism stems from the regulations of Islam and that it

is difficult to separate the terrorist movements from Islamic movements, since they are one and the same; and hence; cannot be separated.

[Al-Qahtani and Al-Talafeha \(2008\)](#), conducted a study that aimed to identify the relationship between religiosity and intellectual rigidity among students in the University of Tabouk. The study population included the students at the Teachers College in Tabouk, with a total of 1604 students distributed in three specializations: Quranic sciences, humanitarian sciences, and scientific sciences in the academic year 2006/2007. The sample consisted of 590 students. In order to achieve the objective of the study, the researcher applied two scales; firstly, the scale of religiosity which was developed by Saleh Al-Sonai'; and secondly, Rockish scale for intellectual rigidity. The researcher used a number of statistical methods to provide answers to the research questions. Statistical regression was used to identify the relationship between religiosity and intellectual rigidity, one-way ANOVA was also employed to pinpoint the differences between religiosity and intellectual rigidity based on the participants' academic specialization. The results of the study demonstrate that there is a very low correlation between religiosity and rigidity, and that religiosity accounts for approximately 1% of the intellectual rigidity found in the study sample, it is also statistically significant at the level of significance ($\alpha \leq 0.05$). As for the academic specialization, the study results show that there are no statistically significant differences in the behavior of religiosity attributed to the variable of specialization. The results also show that there are no statistically significant differences in the dogmatic rigidity due to the variable of intellectual specialization.

[Al-Qor'an \(2008\)](#), conducted a study to identify the means of communication and their impact on some values of university students in the Jordanian society. A questionnaire was used, covering all areas of the study. The study population consisted of university students, who studies at five public and private Jordanian universities at the time of data collection (Al-Yarmok University, Mu'tah University, Al-Balqa Applied University, Private Applied Science University, Irbid Private University). The sample included 1500 students, who returned 1174 questionnaire using descriptive statistics. The results show that university students use modern means of communication, including satellite channels, Internet and mobile phones. These means of communication have a variant impact on the values of these students. Additionally, the results reveal that the demographic variables play a role in the impact of these modern means of communication on students' values. This is due to the fact that the values of work, education, consumption as well as religious values were affected by the use of these means of communication. This effects were most apparent in the students' attitude and behavior.

In a recent study, [Al-Mashaqebah and Aqeel \(2013\)](#), examined political Islam, on the one hand, and the view of the clash of civilizations and the international conflict, on the other. The study aimed at highlighting the contemporary Islamic movements and their interaction with the new world system, as an attempt to investigate the future of these movements in light of the view relating to the clash of civilizations as well as the United Nations adoption of fight against terrorism. Specifically, Western countries made the phenomenon of terrorism related to political Islamic movements, as if they are two sides of a single coin, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. This date marks the time in which America adopted a new policy to fight terrorism. The study used the approach of historical analysis by inserting the factor of time in the historical analysis of events, in addition to using comparative analysis through discussing the variation and differentiation of cultures after the end of the Cold War. This was resulted in a Western perspective that tends to believe in the potential of confrontation instead of dialogue, leading to the comparative approach. The study results reveal that Islam presented a considerable challenge to the trend of Western cultural domination. However, it did not escalate to the point of confrontation with the West, since Western liberalism is still not prevalent in the Muslim world. Democracy has not found its roots in the Arab and Western worlds. Therefore, political Islamic movements are only a phased evolution that is unique to the Muslim world, aiming to overcome the crisis and the problems witnessed by its political organizations and did not reflect any cultural clash with the West. Note that there was no conflict between the West and Islam at the international level, knowing that the West fears that democracy, which the West seeks to instill in the Arab and Islamic world, could take the political Islamic movements up to the authority positions. This, in turn, would result in eliminating the other secular party.

The current study is distinct from the previous studies as follows:

- 1) The first study – to the best of my knowledge - analyzed the index of (the conflict over the optimal model for the end of history between the Islamic caliphate and liberal democracy) in terms of its discussion on the end of history and the intellectual and controversial conflict related to the end of time using the optimal model. This analysis was based on the mental perception of the pioneers concerning both Intellectual perspectives.
- 2) This study used some of the interviews within a theoretical framework, due to the scarcity of theoretical literature on the duality of conflict over Islamic caliphate and international liberalism, as an academic model in the Jordanian society.
- 3) This study is the first one which is conducted on the Jordanian society during the years 1990-2014.

6.2. The End of History Between the Islamic World and Liberal Succession

The study conducted by the Japanese scholar (Francis Fukuyama) is reflected in a statement which implies that "the dichromatic liberalism will take the world to an end". This implication is evident in the article published in *The National Interest* in the summer of 1989, entitled: "the end of history". This developmental theory was established by the German scholar Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This theory considers development as the start of perfectionism, the complete mind and the absolute values. Fukuyama suggests that contemporary liberal democracy cancelled the idea of the relationship between masters and slaves, and that it altered the irrational desire to recognize

the state or the individual on the basis of equality. Therefore, liberal democracy has solved the problem of historical conflict through equality. Consequently, it is the end of history. The same societies will develop in order to reach this American liberal model, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, its old rival ([Al-Mahadeen, 1999](#)), where the point of conflict starts here in the world.

Fukuyama's theory, the end of history, is based on three key components:

- The first component is that contemporary democracy has started to grow since the beginning of 19th century and has gradually prevailed as a civilized alternative to dictatorial systems throughout the world.
- The second component is that the idea of frequent historical conflict between masters and slaves can only have a real end in Western democracies and the economics of free market.
- The third component in Fukuyama's theory is that for many reasons, the radical socialism or communism cannot compete with modern democracy. Therefore, the future will in the grip of capitalism or democratic socialism. Fukuyama intended to oppose the view related to the end of history in Karl Marx's famous theory of "historical materialism", which implies that the end of history of human suppression would end when distinctions between social classes come to an end.

Fukuyama suggests that liberal democracy is based on three main components: political accountability, a strong and effective state, and the rule of law. The problem of the American model, which is subject to dismantling in Fukuyama's opinion, is that for decades the American political development went in the opposite direction and was characterized by corruption. In particular, the political elite is characterized by what it is called "the phenomenon of decay", which led to a state of political rigidity, economic inequality and concentration of wealth in the American administration. This, in turn, allowed certain elite to exploit the ruling system for its own benefit, leading to the increasing dominance of interest groups in the state institutions and in a worrisome manner, subsequently exerting strong pressure on the government to achieve its own interests. Furthermore, the largest economic crisis since the great Recession in the 1930s also contributed to the retreat of the trust of the American public opinion in the performance of the governments ([Fukuyama, 2014](#)).

It is worth pointing out that the idea of the history end is not an old, strange one. Marx was one of the well-known advocates of this view, since he supposed that the historical process develops for a certain purpose. In addition, this development restricts the nature of the influentially mutual financial power, where the conflict lies between the exploiting minority that own almost everything and the exploited majority that has so little resources. He argued that development will come to an end after reaching Marx's Utopia, which will resolve all conflicts. However, the concept of history as a dialectic process was borrowed by Marx from the German scholar Hegel ([Fukuyama, 1989](#)).

In fact, Fukuyama does not believe in history or in its end, and that is evident in the last paragraph of his article, where he reminds us more frequently with the statements related to "phase", than the statements related to the end of history in a philosophical manner. Here, it is important to recall Feber's statement in which he implies that "historical materialism is not a vehicle that we get in or out of whenever we want". Recalling this statement is essential as there are increased doubts regarding the changes that take place throughout the world, whether they are related to a certain rule or they represent a circular loop ([Fukuyama, 2014](#)). If it is a circular loop that ends with the disappearance of civilizations after the growth of large cities, which result in violations of the laws, the prevalence of stray and false opinions, and the pursuit of pleasure, then this entails the emergence of new pioneers and prophets followed by another period of championship. In both cases, the end of history could or could not be reached. However, there must not be an end to vigilance ([Fukuyama, 1989](#)).

In addressing the circular loop and the theories of circular social change, which represent a different possibility from Fukuyama's views, I will briefly review the theory of the Arab scholar Ibn Khaldoun, the founder of the science of urbanization. He argued that societies go back to the starting point within a certain cycle, that is, they retreat, but never die. He also suggested that a society consists of two main sectors: the first one is the Bedouin sector, which moves obligatorily to urbanism, and the second sector passes through four stages, from Bedouin to stability, then urbanization, and finally to the stage of aging and the end of the cycle of human society, which is followed by a new cycle ([Al-Mahadeen, 1999](#)).

With respect to the Arab-Muslim society, the liberal model and the end of history represent the historical dilemma and the center of the secular Islamic conflict in the optimal model to be the end of history. This gives the way for the prominence of Islamic caliphate and the return of Islamic awakening.

Abu Al-Aala Al-Mawdodi is the first scholar to give the concept of divine ruling its absolute political and legal nature as an attempt to build a constitutional theory based on the Islamic doctrine. In particular, he believes that God is the only absolute dominant ruler according to the Quranic verse: "He cannot be questioned as to what He does, while they will be questioned" ([Al-Anbiya': 23](#)). He also provide another legal evidence, namely, God has delegated his legal ruling to prophets and messengers as his representatives in this world. Therefore, the full judgment and ruling are for God and His messengers. Subsequently, this makes Islamic caliphate, according to Al-Mawdodi, a democratic doctrine unlike the Cesarean, Papal or Theocratic doctrines, as defined by the West. The form of democracy that is practiced by the West gives the position of governorship to the public, which is regarded as the holder of the ruling of God in the Islamic caliphate system and not a source for it ([Banin, 2015](#)). This is evident in the slogans that are raised by fundamentalists of different parties, such as (caliphate), (the ruling is for God), and (Islam is the solution) ([Al-Mashaqebah and Aqeel, 2013](#)). Therefore, if we want to define the term 'caliphate', which dates back to the first man who practiced this authority after Prophet Muhammad, the successor of the Messenger of Allah Abu Bakir Al-Siddiq. This term became the title of anyone who heads the Islamic state until the end of the present era ([Banin, 2015](#)). This title also became related to Islamic fundamentalism represented by the organization

of the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS), or the so-called "Da'ish", and its successor, Abu Bakir Al-Baghdadi. The followers of this organization hold an interpretation that is viewed as mistaken by others. Furthermore, the followers of this organization have certain interpretations of some of the Quranic verses, such as: "Allah originates the creation and then He repeats it", "Where they interpret it superficially and say that they are "The group of the end of time", who were chosen by God for the establishment of the second state of God in a way that is similar to the first Islamic state (Isma'il, 1993).

If we looked at the method used, we would see that it is related to fighting, which does not distinguish between Muslims or others in relation to their responsibility for the ignorance in the twentieth century. These groups use power parades, e.g. swords and knives as well as other methods, such as burning and slaughter. They also have the perception that this world can be ruled according to the model of succession or the civil state, which was prevalent in the period of the Prophet (Al-Mashaqebah and Aqeel, 2013). Furthermore, they reject the principle of diligence that is called for by secularism, which is advocated by Al-Tahtawi, Mohammed Abdo and Ali Abdul Razzaq.

With regard to the new Salafi thinking that introduced the project of "Islamic Awakening" through pioneer books and theses, having a certain logic and rationality (Al-Mashaqebah and Aqeel, 2013), I agree with them concerning the principle of intellectual independence and abandoning cultural dependence on the West, in general, and American globalization, in particular. However, it is essential to examine the positive aspects related to the impact of the culture of others on the Arab-Muslim culture. In this vein, these effects of globalization with both its positive and negative sides, as well as its conflict with the Salafi theses in the Arab society, in general, and in Jordan, in particular, will be discussed later on.

It should be noted that achieving Islamic awakening does not take place by overlooking the topical realities of the Arab world, and without taking into account the position of the Arab world within the map of the world, especially since it is now globalized. The fact that Islamic legislation does not have fixed nature should not be forgotten. As far as Islam is concerned, there has been no emergence of a single applied model, and Shari'a is not manifested in a constitution or a set of laws. In addition, even the Islamic State did not pursue the rulings of one of the four prominent imams. Indeed, an important difference should be noted here, since it shows the rigidity of the Islamic State and its development while maintaining its basic laws and principles (Isma'il, 1993).

In this context lies the fundamental point regarding the clash of Islamic and Western cultures that Samuel Huntington implicitly referred to in his book "The Clash Of Civilizations: And The Remaking Of World Order" as well as the bloody conflict between the Muslim Confucianism and the West, in which the strongest prevails. One should not also forget the fear that the West has about Islam and Muslims pertaining to their threat to the liberal model, which, in turn, relates to Islam being its strongest competitor in the whole world.

6.3. Explanatory Theories

6.3.1. Theory of Religious Intensity/ Emile Durkheim

The book written by the French scholar Emile Durkheim (1912) represents the initial images for religious life and is considered as the most daring book he had ever written. It is based on the assumption that was deemed false or at least inaccurate by anthropology. This assumption specifically states that the Totemic – a tribe in Australia- is merely a religion. However, Durkheim still believes that religion is not an illusion, as it represents the beginning of all cultures and civilizations. Specifically, religion is the core of the group and the mysterious power that individuals feel, influencing them if they are not alone. But if they gather to do a joint celebration, it is something that they all share, it organizes their lives and gives them a sense of security and happiness, but imposes on them the moral behavior of the group. The behavior of being united with supernatural power is achieved by sacrificial rituals. These refer to the rituals related to being prepared for wild hunting, fishing, or war. This behavior is also evident in the signs, symbols and magical practices through which the collective organization emerges. The social organization that the members of the society feel and practice is reflected in religion. In doing so, Durkheim overlooked human instinct and the tendency to believe in God, and worship Him as well as the virtues of morality Badir (2008). By adopting this perspective, Durkheim suggests that the origin of religion is social and not related to the unseen. He argues that religion is only a human social fact, since it has a vital role in maintaining the social structure.

Note, here, that the sociology relating to Durkheim aimed to answer questions concerning sociology theory, which is attributed to religious sociology as the foundation upon which it was constructed, since the nineteenth century in the context of changes that resulted from the scientific and industrial revolution and what accompanied it from globalization and modernization, posing questions, such as: how did societies emerge? What are the rules that govern collective life? What are the methods of collective action, feeling and thought? Because of that, Durkheim conducted a field study that addressed the religious life of primitive societies, especially the ritual practices for the Totemic tribe in Australia. This view is manifested in the popular logic expressed by Durkheim which implies that (God is the society). He arrived at this logic through his study on the Totemic religion and suggested that religion is the source of civilizations and the prominent form of social life. In order to confirm his assumption, he examined the distinction between the sacred and the secular, since this distinction is the basic characteristic of religion (Bernard, 1979).

In Durkheim sociology, the social domain cannot be separated from the religious domain, as is evident when it is compared with Totemism. Specifically, the Totem is both a symbol of God and a symbol of the tribe, where the tribe's God that represents the principle of Totem cannot be anything other than the tribe itself. However, it is embodied in a certain symbol and presented by means of imaginative types of plants and animals that are used as Totems. Thus, in Durkheim's view, society "has everything that allows it to be stimulated in the minds, by virtue of

the act that it practices, a sense of divinity, given that the society represents to its members what God represents to His believers".

Sociology as perceived by Durkheim is related to the sociology of knowledge as long as the human society recognizes itself and knows the world starting from religion ([Trigano, 2001](#)). He explained that religion has a social function that emphasizes the social relationships between individuals, leading to the social cohesion that is based on social networking and the pattern of rituals that are practiced in the acts of Hajj and Umrah among Muslims: from Al-Tawaf (walking around Al-Ka'ba), walking between Safa and Marwa, and spending night in Mina as well as others. These are symbolic behaviors that support the community's understanding of its common beliefs. However, the behavior of lighting candles (kudos) is nothing but a behavior that reunites the believers and helps them identify with their religious community to which they belong and unify with their goals and beliefs. In this vein, the view of Durkheim is manifested by connecting the individuals with the society and establishing a sense of the collective feeling that differs from the general beliefs relating to the local and public community, giving people a sense of belonging ([Howard and Taglor, 2013](#)).

6.3.2. Conflict Theory

The conflict theory is categorized under Marxian thoughts, it is also considered as an alternative to the functional structural theory and it represents an exit for the two theories. This is because it holds the basics of both theories at the same time. In this context, Dahaerndov uses the same analytical framework adopted by functional sociologists (i.e. the structures and the social organizations), and argues that the elements of a social organization can work together in a coordinated manner. This can result in conflicts and stress at high levels; societies enjoy movement, and conflict is one of the features related to this movement. In other words, because there is social coordination, there is also stress and confrontations ([Timachief, 1997](#)).

It should be noted here that the conflict theory started by assuming that society is not connected by agreement on the main values, but it represents congeries for groups that found a dynamic equilibrium with the interests of the conflicting groups, and authority is the product of the results of this conflict ([Akers, 2013](#)).

Conflict is formed by the presence of dominating groups, or supported by the government, with the existence of other groups that are supported by the dependent groups, leading to a civil war. Kaufman argues that leaders are stoking the spirit of hostility to gain support from the public, who in turn support these leaders. Consequently, the hostility level can escalate to become a security dilemma that contributes to more mutual public hostility ([Kaufman and stuart, 1996](#)). Therefore, social conflict occurs due to the absence of harmony, balance, order and consensus in a particular social setting, as well as the presence of dissatisfaction regarding the unequal distribution of material resources such as authority, income and property. With respect to the social environment, it includes all groups, whether they are small, such as the minority groups, or large, such as tribes, families and communities, and even nations ([Othman, 2009](#)).

The theory is based on an assumption that society is composed of diverse groups that vary in terms of religion, economic status, social status, ethnic background. In addition, due to the fact that there is constant conflict, the winner in this conflict possesses the power and authority that enables him to serve his own interests in various forms, including laws that determine criminal and normal conduct.

In 1938, Selin examined cultural conflict, including the conflict between different groups as the society progresses, especially if these conflicting groups live in a specific geographical area. [Chambliss and Seidman \(1971\)](#), argue that the values and norms that are stipulated by law do not reflect the values of all groups, and they are often linked to economic and political positions. The higher the economic and political position of a certain group, the greater the likelihood that laws will reflect their values ([Wereikat, 2007](#)).

They confirm that instead of posing the question as to why do some people commit crimes while others do not? The following question should be asked: why are some behaviors defined as criminal, while others are not? The conflict theory answered this question, stating that: the formulation and application of law both directly and indirectly is likely to serve the interests of the most powerful groups in a certain society. When governmental policies tend to provide certain benefits to a particular group at the expense of other groups, the identity of the state becomes linked to a certain group or groups more than others. In this case, competition is generated between groups until it reaches the level of open conflict regarding the sources of power and authority ([Othman, 2009](#)).

Even the early consensus theorists observed that the documented law and the practical law often serve the interests of private groups ([Akers, 2013](#)). A conflict of values and group interests is considered natural in a certain group, while it is regarded as deviation in another. The pluralistic model of conflict also applies to democratic societies in which the groups of competing interests endeavor to advocate their values through legislations and the government ([Akers, 2013](#)). This case applies to Arab countries and to the dissemination of globalization values.

6.3.3. Functional Constructivism

The structure of functionalism stems from its view to the society as a relatively stable structure that consists of a set of integrated elements, each one of them necessarily leads to a positive function that serves the general construction. All the elements of this structure operate within a framework of joint agreements and value consensus. Using power and its implications on meaning can be examined in functional construction by referring to its most prominent pioneers, such as Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton, and through the new functionalism of Jeffry Alexander ([Al-Ghareeb, 2009](#)).

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan employed functional constructivism through the flexibility of the system and the policy of the country, which maintained a considerable distance from the speeches of Islamic groups and

ideologies. This maintained the balance between the two parties (Islamic and secular), respected religious minorities and emphasized on national thought and citizenship as a kind of maintaining the continuity and stability of the social system. This is evident in the absence of violent revolutions and movements in the Jordanian society. The next section discusses the methodology used in this study.

7. Methodology and Procedures

I used structured-interviews, which are conducted based on a certain list of written questions that are asked to the participant who volunteered to take part in this study. The reason behind choosing this kind of interview is due to the sensitivity of the topic and saving the time and effort of the researcher. The same questions are asked to all the participants. Following the analysis of data, the problem of the study can be accurately identified, providing answers to the research questions ([Al-Najjar et al., 2013](#)).

7.1. The Population of the Study

The study population consisted of thought and public opinion leaders in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, who work in a number of universities, namely, the University of Jordan, the Hashemite University, Al-Balqa Applied University, Mu'tah University, Al-Yarmouk University, and Petra University. This group of researchers, academic specialists, leaders, and members in the civil society institutions belong to different parties. They were chosen by referring to the media and social communication, websites, Such as Facebook, Twitter, and Jordan Television, who are constantly rerunning television programs to speak in this field, as well as their publications on their main pages on Facebook.

7.2. The Sample

Eighteen interviews were conducted with a group of thought and public opinion leaders in different governorates in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The sample was chosen based on a manner that is appropriate with the prevalence of political Islamic movements, including thinkers belonging to liberal and Islamic backgrounds in Jordan using a purposive sample method. This method is used to obtain information from a certain group that is able to provide the needed information, either due to their position or according to some criteria that are set by the researcher. These criteria usually aim to include those who are able to provide the needed information and who have good knowledge in the subject matter ([Al-Najjar et al., 2013](#)).

7.3. Validity of the Tool

The validity of the interview tool was confirmed by presenting it to a number of competent arbitrators based on their great experience and knowledge in the field. These arbitrators confirmed that the answers of the interviews' questions measure the intended purposes of this study. This includes language appropriateness, proper content, and coverage of all aspects of the subject matter. Some changes were made to the questions to make them more clear and accurate in investigating the subject of the study.

7.4. Limitations

This study has some limitations, including the refusal of some party leaders and members of some civil society organizations to answer the interview questions, fearing that the study is carried out by certain security authorities, and that they were exclusively chosen to reveal their political views. Some of them were reluctant to answer certain items, since they believed that the answers needed could disclose some political views that they do not want to share with others.

8. The Results, Discussion and Recommendations

[Ghassib \(2016\)](#), argues that the conflict has multiple dimensions, since it is a social and political conflict. However, there is a conflict between the secular and religious sides regarding the nature of the state that each party aims to achieve. Islamic movements aim to revive the caliphate with its different models, such as the model of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Liberation Party and the model of Abu Bakir Al-Baghdadi. Nonetheless, these types of models are old, since they aim to re-pattern certain Islamic heritage, as aspect that all of them have in common. In contrast, secularists are divided into Marxists and liberals, where the model of the state differs among them, but they have a common emphasis on the individual as well as an emphasis on the reality of communities, rather than on the reality of religion which exists in reference books. These reference books vary, that is, the reference books of secularism advocates are new and strange in nature, while the Islamic ones are old, existing in old books and heritage. This suggests that the conflict relates to references, and so it is not superficial as it existed for a long time. However, it was not so acute and was posed as a real case, starting from the revolutions of 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen. There were arguments between sociologists, which implied that Islamic movements are trying to reconcile the two models. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood held elections similar to the Western style, but their ultimate goal was related to the state of succession. On the other hand, secularists began to raise the issue very frankly; few of them advocated the secular state and called for the civil state. In addition, they intended to construct a state similar to the Western style which is a desired style in different parts of the world, including the East, India and Latin America, Africa and the Asian countries. In this style, religion refers to the individual, but not the state. The basic philosophy is that the individual could be Buddhist or Hindu, but the state is not Buddhist or Hindu; the state has no religion, it takes the side of neutrality and cares for all citizens regardless

their religion. Citizens may agree upon certain values that may be derived from the Islamic heritage and religious values, but ultimately this will (i.e. legislation) does not reflect the divine will, but reflects the will of mankind, where a number of citizens agreed on certain interests and a common life style in order to organize their own affairs. This represents the concept of the civil state as raised by the public today.

Indeed, Islamists clearly reject these views, because they believe that the state of caliphate is the only one that implements the law of God, which means that there is a legislation that emanates from God directly, but not from individuals who interpret religious rules based on their interests. This context creates a kind of conflict as some of them exaggerate and do not take reality into account, such as the expiation groups, who tend to use extreme violence in applying Islamic legislation. There are also others, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who use skilled method and make settlement with other political parties, such as the case in Tunisia. This case did not take place in Jordan in a clear manner, as it did in Tunisia, Egypt and places in Syria. In particular, there were no revolutions in Jordan, since the ruling system is a parliamentary monarchy which enjoys more legitimacy, including the national legitimacy of the Great Arab Revolution and religious legitimacy, since the King is the grandson of the Prophet. Jordan maintained its religious traditions. The religion of the state is Islam, but the content of the constitution is civil, and secular to a great extent. The Jordanian state has gathered glory from all its sides and has found a certain way to eliminate this conflict. However, the conflict still exists with the increasing number of Islamic movements and the calls for the caliphate state, such as the appeals of the liberation party. Some expiators define the concept of caliphate in terms of violence because they want to implement the legislation of God using the sword and different killing tools. These people believe that Al-Baghdadi is on the right path, and that he applies the law of God with all its details. These individuals refer to the rules set by Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn Al-Qayim Al-Jawzi, and they also refer to Ibn Hanbal and Mohammad bin 'Abd Al-Wahhab (Al-Wahhabi). On the other hand, the voices of secularists in the Jordanian society began to rise via the social media sites, e.g. Facebook. Many of them are Christians and also Muslims; it is natural for Jordanian Christians to call for secularism, as they want to have equality, and the civil state is more appropriate for them. With respect to Muslims, part of them are secular and some others believe that they are crushed; as a result, they prefer the state of succession.

This conflict exists in Jordan, but it did not escalate like other countries. The conflict in Egypt was violent, because it is related to political factors even though there was a movement in which Islamists participated side by side with other secular groups. However, it was clear that there was a distinction between the demands relating to a civil state, on the one hand, and the demands relating to Islamic religious state, on the other. Most individuals who call for a civil state are Christians, and there is a number of Muslims who are influenced by the life style in the West. These argue that a civil state gives them a part of nominal rights, and they consider Europe as their model. This is because Europe used to be a religious community but with the considerable scientific and technological development, it turned to a civil society. The European model is an example upon which other cultures depend, either in India, Latin America or other nations. Therefore, we are at a time that urges us to take advantage of the experiences of others and achieve more progress in this direction. The conflict refers to a difference of various references, and the Islamic background is different from the secular background. Consequently, it is natural to have this kind of clash between different political parties; a clash that was bloody in some countries, such as the case in Egypt, but was peaceful in other countries, e.g. Tunisia. With regard to Jordan, the conflict is escalating because the expiators are gaining more power in the society, and Jordanians are trying to maintain balance between all different sides. The conflict is also evident in the internal paths of the Jordanian state, in addition to the outside factors, i.e. the Americans who must restrict their position instead of having more than one attitude towards different issues.

[Al-Mahadeen \(2016\)](#), argues that education reduces the idea of conflict, corrects certain behaviors, and sometimes leads to fear. As a result, there would be a lack of a clear conflict. The Jordanian state accommodates both the individual and the group, and due to the long experience of the political system, it was able to develop a security and thought identity. Thus, Jordan used the Arab Spring in a clever way, by emphasizing the disastrous circumstances that are witnessed by neighboring Arab countries and focusing on the loss that occurred to the countries that experience the revolutions of the Arab Spring. As a result, different categories of the Jordanian society were aligned towards the peaceful way of reform instead of revolutions. The case in Jordan is also different as there are no real opposition outside the country. Furthermore, security authorities did not deal violently with political activists. On the contrary, the authorities attempted to resolve any problems peacefully and give them higher position in order to gain their approval.

[Al-Hafi \(2016\)](#), argues that addressing conflict implies addressing the sides of that conflict. Specifically, there is a party that has not abandoned their religious thoughts and will always be a part of the religious culture. Societies do not abandon their religious beliefs easily, and the thought attitude that advocates the caliphate does not represent all political Islamic movements. This is due to the fact that the nature of ruling in Islam is subjected to discretion and thinking. For instance, Malik Ibn Nabi talked about the idea related to an Islamic common wealth, since the view of a caliphate is continuous, and is prone to more discussion. In particular, Islam established general rules and Muslims have to exert all efforts in order to construct the political systems based on the general principles of justice and consultation. [Al-Nawaysa \(2016\)](#), suggests that the conflict between caliphate and secularism represents a mythological case, as there was no caliphate in Islamic History. If there was a caliphate, prophet Mohammad would assign a caliph to be his successor, but he left that for people to agree upon one of them, prophet Mohammad said: "you are more knowledgeable about your life affairs".

[Al-Obeidat \(2016\)](#), argues that in our culture, historical events were expressed culturally, and turned into novels cited by history; they were also given the status of holiness. There is a historical event and cultural event, and historians of the sultans manipulated the historical event to become a cultural event. The historical event may not be

true, whereas the cultural event may turn it into something great. The battle of Al-Jamal was expressed culturally in a way that is not accepted logically, and became beliefs that are taken for granted by the Shi'a even though they are cultural events, rather than historical events. On the other hand, there are historical and great events that were not expressed culturally, and there were also events that were culturally expressed in a false manner. We are witnessing events that are falsified at present and we know that; the case would be similar for the events that took place in the past. Misinformation generates a culture that becomes a part of the man who make judgments on matters that he does not know about.

[Al-Mahadin \(2016\)](#), suggest that the conflict within Islamic domains does not accept the idea of caliphate and calls for secular regimes. There is a reference to the book of Abd Al-Rizq (i.e. Islam and the Origins of Ruling), which appears to be as a response to the King of Egypt and the succession of the Ottoman caliphate in Turkey, after it was cancelled by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk. Furthermore, the conflict between positives and secularists implies other backgrounds that can be included within the general character of the era, taking into account that positivism is one of the views of capitalism, and that Islam is problematic and ambiguous in its diagnosis and location within the era of capitalism. Through referring to what was written by the thinker Mahdi Al-Amel when he distinguished between political sectarianism and religiosity, it is clear that he argues that political ethnicity that appears as political thought projected in the name of Islam is the product of capitalist societies but in its backward and colonial form. Conversely, religiosity is a social phenomenon and an extension of the culture that was formed before capitalism. [Al-Shiyab \(2016\)](#), indicates that although there is a political Islamic trend that has a presence in the Arab world and a weak presence in the Jordanian society, this conflict that we are witnessing is not based on Fukuyama's views, since there are issues and forms that are distant from Fukuyama's assumptions. Fukuyama describes liberal democracy as the end of the world; however, there is no real democracy in the Arab world. Instead, there is political tyranny and the liberalists who govern the states are authoritative, then how could they struggle with political Islam? The absence of democracy is not the reason for all the difficulties in the Arab world. In fact, there is no freedom with poverty. Good financial conditions are preferred to freedom.

[Al-Gharaibeh \(2016\)](#), suggests that the conflict lies in putting religion in its incorrect place and extending it to be applied to irrelevant functions; the law should be put in its right place and Shari'a law should be reformulated according to the situation and the interest of the public. The conflict relates to the limits of religion application. Most issues in religion are not the main things that occupy individuals' thoughts. There is no religious dispute between the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Sisi. The conflict is historical and it exists since the death of prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) until now. There is no punishment related to a belief in a certain religion; no one can force you to change your beliefs. The context of beliefs was manipulated to match the concepts related to people's desires. The authorities established the context based on dispositions about the right things that should be done. For example, Friday advice was set by Muawiyah ibn Abu Sufyan as a process of organizational policy, that precedes the prayer in order to impose some instructions which are not related to religion. In fact, it is a tradition of Imperial Byzantine; thus, secularism is closest to Islam, without secularism there cannot be a pure relationship between the believer and the Creator. [Ayesh \(2016\)](#), believes that the doctrine takes the form of belief. This explains the difference between the previous Rashidun caliphs and the Muslim Brotherhood. This is because it is impossible to change the religious texts, people can be changed by education and by benefiting from the media, by which they become rational and flexible and, in turn, religion becomes rational and flexible.

After analyzing the participants' answers and observing the points on which they agreed and the conflicting points, it appears that the participants in the first question agreed that Islamic milieus reject the idea of succession, because it contradicts the general law applicable to all cases from the viewpoint of some. In addition, because it contradicts historical events, from the viewpoint of others, prophet Mohammad did not recommend a successor before his death, and left sorting out these issues to Muslims using diligence of the nation. Perhaps what happened in Bani Sa'ida, the murder of Omar ibn Al-Khattab, the murder of Othman bin Affan, the dispute between Ali bin Abu Talib and Mu'awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, and the battle of Al-Jamal following a dispute between Aisha and Ali, as well as the differences between the four caliphs as far as determining the succession is concerned give the clearest proof of that. That is, if the closest ones to the time Islam emerged had so much disagreements, then how would the farthest from that time agree on the idea of succession?

Based on that, the majority of interviewees in the second question agree regarding the existence of conflict between the Islamic caliphate model, on the one hand, and between liberal democracy represented in the assumptions of the thinker Francis Fukuyama, on the other regarding the end of history conflict. In particular, they imply that conflict exists, but it depends on the interpretations of the concept of succession and liberal perspective. There are those who believe that there is no contradiction between the caliphate and the liberal model. This is based on the view in which every one of them consider his model, where there is no standard Islamic model, and there is no standard liberal model. There are also those who believe that the conflict is Islamic-Islamic before it is Islamic-liberal. The participants also agree that the perception of succession is different from one political party to another. That is, it is not related to the religious concept of Jihad that is adopted by the armed political Islamic movements.

This result is in agreement with conflict theory, which is based on an assumption that society consists of a variety of groups that have different religious, economic and ethnic backgrounds and that these groups are in constant struggle, but the victor in this conflict turns power to serve his own interests. Cultural conflict includes various groups, as societies progress, especially when these conflicting groups are limited to a specific geographic area.

The results are also in agreement with the religious theory of Emil Durkheim, who considers religion as the source of civilization and the prominent form of social life. This result is similar to that of [Al-Mashaqebah and Aqeel](#)

(2013), which indicated that Islam posed a major challenge to Western cultural dominance, but did not get to the level of actual clash.

Based on these results, the study recommends the following:

- 1) Activating the role of the mosque and the church in our society in a manner that surpasses the media which influences our values, while taking into account the modernity in everything that provides interest to society.
- 2) Setting restrictions and supervision plans on the media, which plays a major role in providing different viewpoints in society. These viewpoints do not always agree with public morals, affecting the individuals' opinions and beliefs, do not commensurate with our religion. These viewpoints should be replaced by the use of image technology that deepens the values of balance between privacy and globalization in terms of thought and behavior.
- 3) Taking courageous steps towards launching an equal and impartial civilizational dialogue, both internally and globally.
- 4) Preparing a program to use the time of youth in educational institutions, and to emphasize the importance of dividing this time accurately between basic needs, work, study, and free time in order to prevent the youth from becoming victims of terrorism and extremism.
- 5) Respecting religious, ethnic and national freedom; diversity does not mean fragmentation, but rather the enrichment of national unity and the development of a single national culture.
- 6) Exerting all efforts to modernize the general goals of education and work programmed to change for the better in education, embracing rational and flexible beliefs. This is because when individuals become more rational and flexible, religion follows suit.
- 7) Expanding and developing scientific research in the field of religious sociology in an attempt to arrive at an integrated model that takes the best from each global model (i.e. Communism, Confucianism, Islamism, and secularism).
- 8) Making a serious attempt to deepen the conscious relationship between conflicting intellectual political views and unifying them with moderation so as to accomplish something new.
- 9) Appreciating individuals rather than neglecting them, and seeking to make the benefit from the experience of others in the world, in all the domains that enhance the interests of the community.
- 10) Establishing a science in fundamentalist movements, and expanding on this subject in universities, educational institutions and study centers.

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Appendix 1

The study tool (1) after arbitration

In the name of God the most merciful, the most compassionate

The title of the study:

On the Conflict of End of History between Islamic Caliphate and Global Liberalism: From the Perspective of Thought and Public Opinion Leaders in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan We hope that toy would cooperate with us in answering the included questions

Thank you for your interest

The researcher:

Khawla Mut'ib Al-Takhineh

1- Name:

2- I belong to a political view: liberal Islamic Marxist others

3- Gender: male female

4- Age (years): 25-34 35-44 45-55 more than 56

5- Religion: Muslim Christian other (optional)

6- Current place of residence:

city village Badia camp

7- The current work :

academic political analyst informative

An official or a member of a civil society organization

A researcher and specialist in religious movements

Party leader or member of a party or intellectual group

The first question:

Do you think that the idea of a "Islamic Caliphate model" to represent the end of history for the Arab and Muslim world is acceptable among Islamic circles, and what is your point of view?

The second question:

In your opinion, is there an intellectual conflict between the two theses of the caliphate in the religious meaning, on the one hand, and the positive liberal model represented in theses of the American thinker Francis Fukuyama in his book "the End of History and the Last Man" (1994)?

Notice: the questions are flexible to the extent that serves the objectives of the interview.

Appendix 2

The names of the participants (thought and public opinion leaders) in personal interviews (the how-approach)

Number	Name	The nature of work
1-	Dr. prof Hisham Ghaseeb	Academic and political analyst
2-	Dr. Mowafaq Al-Mahadeen	Academic and political analyst
3-	Dr. Hussein Al-Mahadeen	Academic and writer
4-	Prof. Amer Al-Hafi	Academic and scholar in religious movements
5-	Dr. Mohammad Al-Shiyab	Academic
6-	Mr. Husni Ayish	Writer and specialist in thought and education
7-	Prof. Thouqan Obaidat	A writer specialized in curricula and education
8-	Mr. Ibrahim Al-Gharaibeh	Researcher and the manager of the strategic studies in the University of Jordan
9-	Mr. Hamid Al-Nawaiseh	A researcher and a historian in History and social thought

*Note: If the search is approved, the names of the sample will be replaced with the symbols instead of the names.